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The performance of the Nuclear Facility (NFAC) incident module in modeling a 
nuclear reactor accident is evaluated.  Fallout predictions are compared with air 
concentration measurements of I-131 in Europe over a five-day period.  Two categories 
of source term specifications are used:  NFAC-generated source terms based on plant 
conditions and accident severity, and user-defined source terms based on specifying the 
release of I-131.  The Atmospheric Transport Model Evaluation Study report source term 
provided the needed detailed release information.  The Air Force Combat Climatology 
Center provided weather data covering Europe during the release’s 11-day duration.   
For the NFAC-generated source terms as few as 20% and as many as 52% of the 
values are within the intended accuracy, depending on which source term specification 
was selected.  For the user-defined source terms, values ranged 35% to 56% being within 
the intended accuracy, again depending on which source term specification was used.  
Performance improved in all cases for monitoring sites closest to Chornobyl, with up to 
87% of the values falling within the intended accuracy.  This indicates there may be a 
limit for selecting the spatial domain, making HPAC more useful as a tool for smaller 




AN EVALUATION OF THE HAZARD PREDICTION AND ASSESSMENT 
CAPABILITY (HPAC) SOFTWARE’S ABILITY TO MODEL THE CHORNOBYL 
ACCIDENT 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Motivation 
 The terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001 resulted in a 
heightened state of concern regarding the safety of the nation’s 103 nuclear power plants, 
and the potential for attacks.  These facilities are a viable terrorist target that could result 
in a significant release of radioactive material.  Although design and operational features 
make the probability of an accidental release of radioactivity very low, when they were 
constructed U.S. nuclear plants were not required by 10 CFR Part 100 to withstand the 
crash of an aircraft [Nuclear News, 2001:14].   Furthermore, accidents or attacks on 
reactors in other nations are important to the U.S. since radioactive material can be 
dispersed globally.  Therefore, a requirement exists for a software tool to predict the 
consequences of a significant release of radioactivity from a nuclear power plant.   
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), with the stated mission to 
safeguard “America and its friends from weapons of mass destruction”  (WMD), has 
developed the Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability (HPAC) software for 
evaluating the consequences for many nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) scenarios.  
Although users of the software are most interested in predicting the consequences of 
scenarios yet to happen, it is important to study previous events using detailed inputs in 
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order to determine the degree to which the software is able to accurately predict 
consequences formerly measured. 
Background 
The HPAC software is a counterproliferation and counterforce tool that predicts 
the effects of NBC material releases into the atmosphere and its collateral effects on 
civilian and military populations.  The software contains six incident models (also called 
source term models) that estimate the releases from different threat scenarios.  These 
models fall into two categories:  WMD Usage and NBC Releases.  Table 1 provides a 
description of the six models.  The Nuclear Facility (NFAC) incident model is the focus 
of this research.  Updates of the software will incorporate other incident models, 
including the Nuclear Weapon Incident (NWI) model for modeling “broken arrow” 
scenarios (loss of control or theft of a nuclear weapon). 
Table 1.  Description of the HPAC Source Term Models 
Incident Model HPAC Category Description 
Chemical Biological Weapon 
(CBWPN) 
WMD Usage Release of material from chemical 
and biological weapons 
Nuclear Weapon (NWPN) WMD Usage Release of radioactive material from 
detonation of a nuclear weapon 
Radiological Weapon (RWPN) WMD Usage Release of radioactive material by 
explosion dispersion (non-nuclear) 
Chemical/Biological Facility 
(BFAC/CFAC) 
NBC Release Conventional warhead attack on 
chemical and biological facilities 
Nuclear Weapon at Biological 
Facility (NWBFAC) 
NBC Release Nuclear weapon detonation at a 
biological facility 
Nuclear Facility (NFAC) NBC Release Accidental release of radioactive 
material to the atmosphere 
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The HPAC software performs its function in three sequential steps:  hazard source 
definition, transport, and effects.  Hazard source definition requires the use of one of the 
incident models to define the what, where and when of an incident.  For the NFAC model 
this involves identifying the nuclear facility, the type of accident at the facility and the 
specifics of the release.  An alternative to defining the release in NFAC is to prepare a 
Rad file outside of NFAC to allow for greater control over the source term specification.  
(The origin of the name ‘Rad file’ is unknown [Sjoreen, 2002].  It is the three-letter suffix 
used for the file calculated by the source term generator in the HPAC software.)  The 
source term algorithm in the HPAC software is based on a methodology prepared by the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).  This methodology states that even if all the 
accident conditions are known, the best one can hope for in estimating the true source 
term is within a factor of 100 [NUREG-1228, Ch. 1:8].  Source term specification will be 
discussed further in Chapter III and Appendix A.  Transport involves the use of a 
transport and dispersion model to accurately move the NBC material through the 
atmosphere, and calculate deposition at geographic locations.  The transport model used 
in HPAC is the Second-order Closure Integrated Puff (SCIPUFF) model, a Lagrangian 
frame of reference, Gaussian puff model.  As with source term definition there is a limit 
to the accuracy of a transport model.  Even a complex model such as SCIPUFF will be 
limited to about a factor of two [Eisenbud:81].  Weather and terrain data, defined by the 
user in the incident model during the hazard source definition step, and other files created 
by NFAC are used by SCIPUFF to accurately transport the hazard. Effects, the final step 
of the sequence, provides the user with a map interface that displays the consequences of 
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Figure 1.  HPAC Sequence [DTRA, 2000:Ch. 10] 
the release on the surrounding area.  Calculated results include air concentration, ground 
concentration, horizontal slice, radiation dose and radiation dose rate, that are available to 
plot.  Figure 1 illustrates the HPAC sequence. 
Modeling the Chornobyl accident serves a useful purpose:  A recent query on the 
International Atomic Energy Agency’s website (www.iaea.org/worldatom/) of 
operational reactors indicated that 17 RBMK (Russian acronym for Reactor Bolshoi 
Moschnosti Kanalynyi, meaning Channelized Large Power Reactor) reactors are still in 
use in Russia and Lithuania.  A previous thesis studied NFAC using the Three Mile 
Island accident, a scenario with a lesser release and local fallout footprint [Frederick, 
2000]. 
Problem Statement 
The research objective is to evaluate the performance of the NFAC module of the 
HPAC software using the Chornobyl accident as a single case study and determine the 
software’s usefulness for modeling nuclear facility accidents.   
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Scope 
This research focuses on the NFAC module of the HPAC version 3.2.1 software 
to model the accident at the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (NPP).   Modeling the 
Chornobyl accident should challenge the HPAC software due to the sheer magnitude of 
the disaster, the particulate nature of the release, and the extent of the fallout.   During 
this research project, DTRA released a new version of HPAC (4.0).  However, the 
modifications made to the NFAC module produced incorrect results [Sjoreen, 2001b].  
Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) made available a beta of HPAC version 4.0.1 
that corrected the problems in NFAC.  However it did not integrate all the features of 
version 3.2.1.  Although the SCIPUFF transport and dispersion model is a vital part of the 
HPAC software, its performance is not evaluated in this research.  The transport and 
dispersion model has been verified and validated in the development process of the 
HPAC software [Bradley, et al.]. 
General Approach 
 The research began with a literature review of the Chornobyl accident to 
understand the cause of the accident and the source term.  Several publications provided a 
thorough accounting of the accident, including “Chernobyl Record” [Mould], and the 
NRC technical report “Report on the Accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station” 
[NUREG-1250].  The most comprehensive study of transport models to predict the 
fallout from the accident is documented in the 1992 study, “Evaluation of Long Range 
Atmospheric Transport Models using Environmental Radioactivity Data from the 
Chernobyl Accident:  The ATMES Report”  [Klug, et al.].  The Atmospheric Transport 
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Model Evaluation Study (ATMES) report used data collected from iodine-131 (I-131) 
and cesium-137 (Cs-137) concentrations measured throughout Europe.   Twenty-one 
transport models from organizations worldwide were evaluated in the study. 
The HPAC software was run using different source term specifications, including 
an external Rad file that modeled the ATMES source term.  Appendix A provides 
information on the custom Rad file created to model the I-131 releases.  Input parameters 
were varied in order to attempt to model the resulting fallout from the Chornobyl 
accident.  Point-wise comparisons for specific geographic locations were made with the 
dataset of I-131 air concentrations and the predictions obtained from the HPAC software 
runs.   
The Air Force Combat Climatology Center (AFCCC) in Asheville, North 
Carolina provided the external weather data used in the research.  The information 
consisted of soundings (i.e. weather data) during the accident time period from 119 
upper-air profile stations and several hundred surface observation stations in Europe.  
The upper-air profile had a resolution of observations every six hours, and the surface 
observations provided data several times each hour.  Software simulations using both 
upper-air and surface data were conducted.  Appendix B provides additional information 
on the weather data and its format. 
Thesis Overview 
This document consists of five chapters and three appendices.  Chapter II presents 
an account of the Chornobyl accident, including background information on the reactor 
design and how it contributed to the cause of the accident.  A description of the NFAC 
incident model and its methodology are presented in Chapter III, providing information 
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on the several ways an analyst can model the Chornobyl accident.  Chapter IV presents 
the results of the HPAC data runs, and contains the HPAC predictions and comparison to 
actual measured data from the accident.  All of the results are presented in tabular form, 
with some of the results also presented as the contour plots produced by the software.  
Chapter V includes the research summary, conclusions, recommendations for modifying 
the HPAC software, and recommendations for future research.  A glossary of acronyms 
and other technical terms is included on page 91.  Three appendices provide information 
on preparation of the custom Rad file, a description of the weather data formats, and 
additional HPAC contour plots not provided in the results chapter. 
Use of Place Names and Times 
 In 1986 the Soviet Union was comprised of 15 constituent republics, including the 
Ukraine Republic.  At the time of the accident the accepted spelling of the power plant 
and the city was the Russian spelling of “Chernobyl.”  Today, Ukraine has sought to re-
institute its spelling of “Chornobyl.”  This is now the accepted spelling by the Board on 
Geographic Names (BGN) of the United States Geological Survey (USGS).  In this thesis 
the current version is specified except when used in the titles of books, tables and figures 
published with the old spelling.   
 Ukraine is located in Eastern Europe.  Results of the literature review found the 
local time at Chornobyl to be GMT+2 (Greenwich Mean Time plus 2 hours), GMT+3 
and GMT+4 (GMT is also known as Universal Time Coordinated, UTC, or Zulu time).  
Many documents provided only the local time for activities at Chornobyl.  The database 
in HPAC recognizes the time at Chornobyl as GMT+2, as does the website 
www.timezone.org.  However, review of documents published soon after the accident 
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gave the time as GMT+4.  The GMT+4 time is used to standardize the use of times in the 
figures, tables, and HPAC software data runs.   
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II.  The Chornobyl Accident 
 
 This chapter provides design information for the Chornobyl reactor and an 
account of the accident.  It also includes a comparison with the accident at Three Mile 
Island to provide a perspective of the severity of both accidents. 
Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant 
The unit #4 reactor was one of four identical reactors operating at the Chornobyl 
NPP (officially named the V.I. Lenin NPP) in the Ukraine at the time of the accident.  
Construction of unit #4 was completed in December 1983 and it went on line in April 
1984.  Two additional units were under construction at the power plant at the time of the 
accident, with completion scheduled for 1985 and 1986.  The Soviet Union showed 
considerable pride in the RBMK design, and considered it “to be their ‘national’ reactor” 
[NUREG-1250, Chap 2:3].  Figure 2 provides a cutaway view of the unit #4 reactor 
facility. 
The RBMK Design 
The RBMK design is graphite-moderated and light water-cooled, using uranium 
fuel that is slightly enriched (2% uranium 235) uranium dioxide (UO2).  It is a uniquely 
Soviet design that is no longer used anywhere else in the world.  At the time of the 
accident there were 20 reactors of the RBMK design operating in the Soviet Union 
[Morris, 1996:4].  The RBMK design was chosen in the 1960s as the Soviet’s first type of 
reactor for power generation because they had significant experience in running graphite 
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Figure 2.  General Overview of the RBMK Reactor [Medvedev:7] 
 
reactors.  A reactor of similar design had been used in the USSR for weapons-grade 
plutonium production [NUREG-1250, Chap 2:1]. 
The RBMK-1000 reactor has a power rating of 1000 MW(e) (megawatt 
electric)/3200 MW(t) (megawatt thermal).  The core contains 1700 tons of graphite 
stacked 7 meters high and 12 meters in diameter with 2000 pressure channels for the 
insertion of 1661 fuel assemblies, 211 control rods, and instrumentation.  There is a 
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requirement for an absolute minimal insertion of 30 control rods to maintain safe 
operations [OECD:15].  Figure 3 provides a detailed cross-sectional view of the reactor. 
 
Figure 3.  Cross-Sectional View of RBMK-1000 [NUREG-1250, Chap 2:12] 
 
Advantages of this design are on-line refueling and the capability to scale the 
reactor to ever-larger power ratings.  The Soviet Union already had 1500 MW(e) reactors 
operating and was planning to construct a 2400 MW(e) reactor at the time of the accident 
[NUREG-1250, Chap 2:3].  Another distinguishing feature involves the separation of the 
core into two halves, with each side having an independent core cooling system.  (Note 
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the master circulating pumps on each side in Figure 2 on page 9.)  This allows shutdown 
of half the reactor to achieve a 50% power rating.  However, compared to Western 
reactors, there are several disadvantages to this design that contributed to the accident:  
(1) positive reactivity feedback, (2) lack of a pressure vessel and containment building, 
(3) slow to respond control rods, and (4) safety systems that could be overridden. 
The RBMK reactor design experiences positive reactivity feedback for a coolant 
void and the graphite temperature, i.e., as these parameters increase reactivity is inserted 
vice removed.  Positive coolant void feedback means that a loss of coolant increases the 
fission rate of the fuel.   (With Western-designed reactors, water serves as the coolant and 
neutron moderator; hence a loss of coolant results in negative reactivity.)  The heat 
generated in the graphite as a result of moderating the neutrons is removed via the 
circulating water pumped through channels in the core from the bottom to the top.  If the 
flow rate of the water is reduced or stopped, the temperature rises and the boiling 
increases.  The resulting heat buildup in the graphite inserts additional reactivity.  
Positive reactivity coefficients, in themselves, are not impossible to control.  However, in 
a core as large as the RBMK, the condition requires good quality instrumentation and 
control systems to cope with localized disturbances in the power level [Nuclear News, 
1986:91].  As a result, unlike water-moderated/water-cooled reactor designs of the United 
States, the Soviet Union’s graphite-moderated reactors are unstable.   
The lack of a pressure vessel and containment allowed the release of radioactive 
material directly to the atmosphere.  The primary motivation for the design of the 
Chornobyl-style reactors was cost, not safety [Marples, 1986:35].  The Soviet Union did 
not make the same sort of investment in containment as other nations that followed a 
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Western-type design did.  While the reactor core was sealed in a metal container and 
surrounded by concrete, the rest of the reactor building was constructed of a steel, 
industrial-standard structure.  (Western-designed reactor cores are contained in a steel 
pressure-vessel.)  If a breach of the reactor occurred, there was minimal containment to 
prevent release of radioactive material into the atmosphere.  Despite the lack of a 
Western-designed containment facility however, it is doubtful that any structure could 
have contained the force of the explosions from the Chornobyl accident [Medvedev:4]. 
The slow-to-respond control rods meant that the fission process could not be 
stopped quickly.  Furthermore, the design of the control rods themselves contributed to 
the accident.  Boron, a neutron absorber, was encased in aluminum, with a graphite 
follower added to the bottom of the control rod.  The graphite follower was used to 
overcome the build-up of water that occurred in the pressure channel when the control 
rod was fully removed.  The graphite follower would displace the water and contribute to 
the reactivity, unlike the water, which would absorb neutrons.  However, it took 15-20 
seconds to fully insert the control rod into the core and remove the graphite follower 
[Knief:306].  Hence, at a time when the fission rate needed to be reduced or halted, the 
reactivity increased as the graphite follower was slowly pushed out the bottom of the 
core.  Figure 4 is a diagram of the control rods, showing their position in the core when 
inserted and withdrawn.  (Note that when the control rods are fully withdrawn the 
graphite follower is centered in the core.) 
A final, serious design flaw was that no safety systems, including the control rods, 
operated automatically, independent of the operator [Mould:298].  The ability for an 
operator to purposely shut down safety systems and put the reactor in an unstable 
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Figure 4.  Schematic Drawing of Fully Withdrawn and Fully Inserted Control Rods 
[NUREG-1250, Chap 2:32] 
 
 
condition is unheard of with Western-designed reactors.  Yet, at Chornobyl the operators 
purposely shut off emergency cooling systems and disabled emergency shutdown signals 
in order to carry out a test to validate the safety of the RBMK design.  Even in the 
moments prior to conducting the test, when all indications pointed to an unstable core, the 
last remaining emergency signal was blocked and the test began [Knief:454]. 
Account of the Accident 
 The explosion occurred on Friday, 25 April 1986 at 21:23 GMT (Saturday, 26 
April 1986, 01:23 local time).  At the time of the accident the reactor operators were 
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conducting a test of the station’s electrical back-up generators.  In the event of a blackout 
at the plant, engineers theorized that the inertia of the now freewheeling, electricity-
producing turbines could be used to maintain coolant flow until the emergency generators 
came online to operate the coolant pumps.  This was a concern because the back-up 
power was supplied by diesel generators which required 15 seconds to come up to full 
power and drive the coolant pumps [NUREG-1250, Chap 2:37].  This test had been 
attempted at least twice in the past [Knief:451].  However, this particular test was 
unauthorized, and was occurring over a weekend, and at night, when supervision at the 
plant would have been minimal. 
 At 21:06 GMT, 24 April, shutdown procedures began with the lowering of the 
control rods into the core.  Twelve hours later, at 09:05 GMT, the power level in the 
reactor dropped to 50%.  For the test to take place, the engineers needed the power level 
to reach 30%, which would have occurred by 16:00 GMT on 25 April.  However, 
because of a need for power, the Soviet electricity authorities in Kiev refused to allow a 
further reduction in the power level [Mould:34]. 
 With the reactor continuing to operate at about half-power for the next nine hours, 
xenon-135, a neutron absorber, began to build up in the core.  When permission was 
given to continue the shutdown of the reactor at 19:10 GMT, the power level dropped to 
1%, approximately 30 MW(t).  This level was inadequate to conduct the test since there 
wasn’t enough power available to turn the coolant pumps and the turbines which required 
at least 60 MW(e)/180 MW(t) [Medvedev:30].    Rather than abort the test and shut the 
reactor down, the engineers chose to withdraw 24 of the final 30 control rods in an 
attempt to increase the power level [OECD:15].  Power rose briefly to 7% (200 MW(t)) 
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by 21:00 GMT.  To ensure adequate cooling following the test, all eight coolant pumps 
were turned on [NUREG-1250, Ch. 4:4].  This resulted in a high flow rate that limited the 
voiding in the coolant, requiring still further withdrawal of the control rods.   
 At 21:23 GMT the test began.  The engineers realized that the power level was 
accelerating rather than staying constant as needed for the test.  They decided to insert all 
the control rods that were removed.  Because of the design of the control rods discussed 
earlier, the power level continued to increase.  Between 21:23:43 GMT and 21:23:48 
GMT (a span of just over four seconds) the power level reached 100 times full power.  
The resulting heat vaporized the pressurized water, leading to the steam explosion that 
blew the concrete cover plate off the reactor core.  The zirconium cladding of the fuel 
rods and the graphite of the core, now exposed to steam and air, oxidized, forming 
hydrogen.  This caused a second explosion (of the hydrogen) two to three seconds later 
that discharged chunks of graphite and fuel out of the reactor building. 
 An American satellite that had by chance passed over the site in an orbit to 
monitor missile launches observed the first indication in the West of an accident. 
America’s initial assessment was that a nuclear missile had been fired, then when 
the image remained stationary, opinion changed to a missile had blown up in its 
silo.  It was only when a map of the area was consulted that it was realized that it 
was the Chernobyl NPP. [Mould:48-49] 
 
On Sunday evening, 27 April, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 
Vienna was being asked to confirm that an accident had occurred [Mould:49]. 
 Even in the era of Perestroika (“restructuring”) and Glasnost (“openness”), initial 
information from the then-Soviet Union concerning the accident was not forthcoming or 
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accurate.  The first official acknowledgment of an accident occurred on the evening of 28 
April with the following announcement on Soviet television: 
An accident occurred at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant as one of the reactors 
was damaged.  Measures are being taken to eliminate the consequences of the 
accident.  Aid is being given to those affected.  A government commission has 
been set up. [Hopkins:38] 
 
By this time the West already had confirmation of the accident, when radiation alarms 
went off at the Forsmark Nuclear Power Plant in Sweden at 08:00 GMT, 28 April 
[Medvedev:196].  Initially, plant operators in Sweden feared a leak at their facility.  
Measurements at other facilities in Sweden provided independent confirmation that the 
source of the release was inside the Soviet Union. 
Core Inventory and Radionuclides Released 
 The Chornobyl source term has been estimated in several publications and is 
based on three methods:  estimation of the shutdown core inventory of radionuclides and 
the amount of fuel remaining in the melted core after the accident; studies of the release 
dynamics during the active phase of the accident; and soil, air and water measurements 
following the accident [Aarkrog, et al.:74].  About one-quarter of the total radioactive 
material was released during the early stages of the accident, decreasing to a minimum on 
1 or 2 May, and then increasing daily until 6 May when the release all but ceased.   
Source term estimations have improved over time with the pattern being an ever-
increasing estimate of the radioactivity released.  The 1986 Soviet report on the accident 
stated that a total of 50 million Curies (MCi), or 1.85E18 Becquerels (Bq), were released 
with an error of ±50% [UNSCEAR, 1988:306].  This value did not include the release of 
noble gases that was also estimated at 50 MCi (1.85E18 Bq).  Not including noble gases 
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in release estimates is a common practice, as they are chemically inert, and thus are not 
reactive and would pass through human tissue without being retained.  Figure 5 shows 
the source term estimation provided by the Soviet Union at the IAEA conference (August 
1986) on the accident.  The quantities shown in Figure 5 are calculated for 6 May 1986 
taking into account radioactive decay up to that date.  For example, the 12 MCi shown for  
 
Figure 5.  Daily Activity Release From the Chornobyl Reactor, Decay Corrected to 6 




26 April, when decay corrected from 6 May to 26 April, would result in about 20 MCi for 
the actual release.  The figure does not provide data on the activity release resulting from 
noble gases, e.g. Kr-85 and Xe-133.  Two years after the accident the estimated release 
was revised upward in excess of 100 MCi (3.70E18 Bq) [Knief:458].  Ten years later, the 
IAEA estimated the total release, excluding noble gases, to be 143 MCi (5.30E18 Bq) 




26 27 28 29 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 




[UNSCEAR, 2000:518].   Table 2 provides current estimates of the core inventory, and 
the percent and amount of radionuclides released in the accident. 












      Kr-85   10.72 y     8.92E+05    100.0     8.92E+05 
     Xe-133     5.24 d     1.76E+08    100.0     1.76E+08 
     I-131     8.02 d     3.51E+07      20.0     7.03E+06 
     Te-132     3.20 d     8.65E+06      15.0     1.30E+06 
     Cs-134     2.07 y     5.14E+06      10.0     5.14E+05 
     Cs-137   30.07 y     1.77E+07      13.0     2.30E+06 
     Mo-99      2.75 d     1.30E+08        4.8     6.24E+06 
     Zr-95   64.02 d     1.19E+08        4.4     5.23E+06 
     Ru-103   39.27 d     1.11E+08        2.9     3.21E+06 
     Ru-106         1.02 y     5.68E+07        2.9     1.65E+06 
     Ba-140   12.75 d     7.84E+07        5.6     4.39E+06 
     Ce-141   32.50 d     1.19E+08        2.3     2.74E+06 
     Ce-144 284.60 d     8.65E+07        2.8     2.42E+06 
     Sr-89   50.52 d     5.41E+07        4.0     2.16E+06 
     Sr-90   28.78 y     5.41E+06        4.0     2.16E+05 
     Pu-238   87.70 y     2.70E+04        3.0     8.11E+02 
     Pu-239  24065 y     2.16E+04        3.0     6.49E+02 
     Pu-240    6537 y     2.70E+04        3.0     8.11E+02 
     Pu-241    14.4 y     4.59E+06        3.0     1.38E+05 
     Cm-242  162.8 d     7.03E+05        3.0     2.11E+04 
                                                                                                   Source:  Mould, 2000. 
 
From a radiological standpoint, Cs-137 and I-131 are the most important 
radionuclides to consider in the release from the Chornobyl accident, because they are 
responsible for most of the radiation exposure received by the general population 
[UNSCEAR, 2000:456].  Table 3 gives an estimate of the source term determined by the 
IAEA, World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the Commission of the European 
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Communities (EC) from a joint commission studying the atmospheric transport of 
radiation from the Chornobyl accident. 
Table 3.  Estimated Release Rates for Cs-137 and I-131 [Klug, et al.:358] 
 
 
The data in Table 3 are consistent with several other publications for the total release of 
activity from Cs-137 and I-131.  This source term is broken into 11 release periods of 24 
hours each, with an additional specification that the first release period can be further 
divided into two release periods; an initial release lasting 6 hours at an effective stack 
height of 1500 meters and containing 20% of the first day’s release, and the second 
release period of 18 hours at a height of 600 meters containing the remaining 80% [Klug, 
et al:358].  As expected, this detailed source term proved to be more effective in 
predicting the consequences using HPAC than source terms that simply provided a total 
release. 
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Figures 6 through 9 provide midday weather charts for four days during the 
release period.  The movement of the plume can be broken down into three release 
periods.  The early part of the release spread into Poland Scandinavia on 27-28 April.  
This was followed from 29 April until 2 May by the movement of the plume east into 
Russia.  After 2 May the plume spread to the southwest and west into Europe. 
 




Figure 7.  Midday Weather Chart for 30 April 1986 [ApSimon, et al:296] 
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Figure 9.  Midday Weather Chart for 5 May 1986 [ApSimon, et al:296] 
 
Comparison with Three Mile Island 
 To place the radioactivity released from the Chornobyl reactor in perspective, it is 
useful to judge against radioactivity releases from previous nuclear events.  Often, 
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comparisons are made with releases from atmospheric nuclear weapon tests.  For 
example, Eisenbud states that the Cs-137 released from the accident was equivalent to 
about 3% of the more than 500 atmospheric tests conducted by all nations 
[Eisenbud:415].  Although this provides an indication of how catastrophic the Chornobyl 
accident was, it serves as a poor comparison for several reasons.  Whereas nuclear 
weapon tests produced fallout generated by the detonation of fission and fusion devices, 
the Chornobyl fallout resulted from a conventional explosion of the reactor core.  This 
dissimilarity produces different mixtures of radionuclides making direct comparisons 
misleading.  Additionally, the injection heights into the atmosphere were different and the 
weapon tests were conducted in isolated locations away from population centers [Aarkog 
et al.:100].  The accident at Three Mile Island also involved a release of material.  
(However, the release was gaseous material, and not the result of an explosion.) 
The accident at Three Mile Island unit #2 (TMI-2), on March 28, 1979, was the 
worst commercial reactor accident in the United States.  It was characterized as a loss of 
coolant accident (LOCA).  The TMI-2 accident began when a pressure relief valve 
malfunctioned, and conditions worsened when operators incorrectly diagnosed the 
problem.  (In the case of the Chornobyl accident, operator involvement initiated the chain 
of events that lead to the accident.)  The TMI-2 accident resulted in the upper portions of 
the uranium fuel assemblies melting from the extreme heat and flowing down through the 
core in the reactor vessel before re-solidifying.  Despite the destruction of the fuel, very 
little radioactive material escaped because the reactor pressure vessel did not fail.  Most 
of the radiation released was attributable to the noble gases xenon-133 and krypton-88.  
For I-131 the Chornobyl accident released one million times more activity than was 
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released at TMI, and for all non-noble gas activity released, the Chornobyl accident 
released ten millions times more activity than did TMI.  Table 4 provides a comparison of 
selected radionuclides released from the Chornobyl and TMI accidents.  Table 2 on page 
19 provides data on several other radionuclides released from the Chornobyl accident.  
For the TMI accident the release was limited to “Xe-133 (mostly), Xe-133m, Xe-135, 
Xe-135m, Kr-88, and traces of I-131” [Frederick:14]. 
Table 4.  Comparison of Releases from TMI and Chornobyl 
Radionuclide Total Released from TMI (Ci) 
Total Released from 
Chornobyl (Ci) 
   Xe-133        8.30E+06           1.76E+08 
   Kr-85 N/A           8.92E+05 
   Kr-88        1.70E+06 N/A 
   I-131        1.49E+01           4.86E+07 
   Cs-137        0.00E+00           2.30E+06 
Total Release 
(non-noble gases)     < 1.50E+01           1.43E+08 
           Sources:  UNSCEAR 2000, Mould 2000. 
 
Of note is that following the Chornobyl accident the NRC concluded that no 
immediate changes were needed in the United States regarding the design and operation 
of U.S. commercial nuclear reactors [NUREG-1251, Vol. I:2]. 
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III.  Description of the HPAC Software and NFAC Incident Model 
 
This chapter provides information on the development of the HPAC software, the 
procedures used in running the HPAC software for this research, and a discussion of the 
source term methodology behind the NFAC model execution.  Throughout the remainder 
of the thesis, words and names used in the software are italicized. 
Software Origin 
The HPAC 3.2.1 software is composed of six incident models that predict the 
source term for a particular incident.  The six models are for incidents involving 1) 
chemical and biological facilities, 2) nuclear facilities, 3) chemical and biological 
weapons, 4) nuclear weapons, 5) radiological weapons and 6) nuclear weapons used 
against a biological facility.   
The predecessor to NFAC is the Radiological Assessment System for 
Consequence Analysis (RASCAL) software developed in 1989 by the NRC to predict the 
release and consequences of an accident at a U.S. reactor.  The RASCAL software 
predicted the source term from an accident based on the methodology specified in the 
1988 NRC Report NUREG-1228 “Source Term Estimation During Incident Response to 
Severe Nuclear Power Plant Accidents.”  The software then transported the release using 
the TADMOD (Transport And Dispersion MODel), developed by Pacific Northwest 
National Laboratory [Sjoreen, 2001b].   
The RASCAL software met a need for DTRA in the early 1990’s (then DNA, 
Defense Nuclear Agency).  The source term model developed by the NRC served as one 
of the incident models in a software program then under DNA development.  The 
TADMOD transport and dispersion model was replaced with SCIPUFF (Second Order 
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Closure Integrated PUFF), a transport model already developed for DNA.  With this 
software predicting the consequences of not only a radiological incident, but other 
incidents as well, DNA named their program HASCAL (Hazard Assessment System for 
Consequence Analysis).  Since HASCAL maintained a worldwide database of nuclear 
facilities, additional research was needed to develop the plant conditions and source term 
characterizations for the non-U.S. reactors in the database. This included the RBMK 
reactor design from the Chornobyl accident.  This work was done at ORNL and 
documented in “Source Term Estimates for Commercial Non-U.S. Reactors” 
[ORNL/TM-13309].  The HASCAL software has been updated and improved several 
times since its initial release in 1996, and today is known as HPAC.  
Using the Software to Define the Chornobyl Accident in NFAC 
 Upon starting the HPAC software the HPAC startup window (Figure 10) appears.  
From this screen the analyst can open an existing project, create a new project or view the 
online help. 
 
Figure 10.  The HPAC Startup Window 
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 When New Project is selected from the HPAC startup window the Save As File 
Control dialog box (Figure 11) appears for the analyst to name the project file.  After 
providing a project filename and clicking OK the user is ready to set up the new project 
and define the incident. 
 
Figure 11.  Save As File Control Dialog Box 
  
Figure 12 shows the New Project Setup dialog box in which the analyst sets the 
initial parameters for the project, including the coordinate format in which locations are 
specified, the reference time used for the project, and the run mode SCIPUFF will use 
(standard versus fast).  When fast mode is selected SCIPUFF relaxes select parameters in 
order to speed up the computation time [DTRA, 1999:42].  Table 5 lists the differences in 
the two run modes.  The Dynamics option specifies whether or not SCIPUFF takes 
account of buoyancy and momentum rise effects.  The Hazard option allows weather 
uncertainty effects to be taken into account in the SCIPUFF calculations.  Since weather 
data of known observations were used in this research the default Hazard Off selection  
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Figure 12.  New Project Setup Dialog Box 
 
was used.  If required, the user can change the selections during final review of the 
incident simulation. 
Table 5.  Difference Between Standard and Fast Run Modes 
SCIPUFF Parameter Standard Mode Fast Mode 
Height of the vertical 
domain 2500m 5000m 
Default vertical 
domain resolution 250m 1000m 
Default maximum 
vertical grid points 15 7 
Horizontal  
resolution As needed 
1/160th of the 
domain 
                                                                                         Source:  Sykes, 2001. 
 
The HPAC software is designed for two types of users, Operational and 
Analytical.  (Both of these are referred to as ‘analysts’ in this thesis.)  Operational users 
include service members and commanders who need to quickly predict the consequences 
of an event, and may not necessarily have the technical background to understand the 
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scientific details of the release being modeled.  Analytical users are involved in research 
and development, and typically want full control of the release parameters available in 
the Advanced edit mode.  Figure 13 shows the New PROJECT Editor window with the 
Operational edit mode selected.  A feature of the HPAC software allows users to toggle 
between the Operational and Advanced edit modes as needed.  This feature allows a user 
to modify a scenario that was previously, and quickly, created using the Operational edit 
mode.  Selecting the Audit… button allows the user to add/change the project metadata, 
e.g. the title, security classification, analyst’s name and creation date of the project. 
 
Figure 13.  New PROJECT Editor Window (Operational Mode) 
  
When the Incident… button is pressed in the New PROJECT Editor window the Incident 
Control window (Figure 14) opens to allow the user to define the incident.  This window 
provides a description of the incident scenario.  From the Incident Control window the 
user selects New… to create an incident.  Figures 15 through 27 illustrate the information 
required for creating an incident involving the RBMK reactor.  
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Figure 14.  Incident Control Dialog Box 
  
Figure 15 shows the New Incident dialog box that allows the user to define an incident 
using one of the seven incident models available in HPAC.  After providing an incident 
name and selecting the incident type the user presses Continue… to define the where, 
what and when of the incident. 
 
Figure 15.  New Incident Dialog Box 
  
Figure 16 shows a completed Incident Summary window defining the where, what, when 
and other options of the NFAC incident.  These four are discussed further and illustrated 
in Figures 17 through 28. 
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Figure 16.  Incident Summary Window 
  
The where of an NFAC incident is defined in the Site dialog box (Figure 17).  The 
HPAC software maintains a worldwide database of power reactors, research reactors, and 
reprocessing facilities.  After the user chooses the Chornobyl unit #4 reactor, NFAC 
selects the corresponding reactor inventory file and determines the reactor’s geographic 
location from the database.  Alternately, the user can set the reactor in a different location 
or provide a custom inventory file.  These features allow for modeling facilities with new 
information that has yet to be incorporated in a software update.    Reactors that are no 
longer operating or are yet to be completed are also maintained in the database.  Thus, 
although Chornobyl unit #4 no longer exists, it is maintained in the database to let HPAC 
users study the accident. 
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Figure 17.  Site Dialog Box 
  
When the user selects the What button in the Incident Summary window (Figure 
16) with the Operational radio button selected, the Operational Mode dialog box appears 
(Figure 18).  In this mode, the user’s only option is to select the severity of the accident.  
This invokes a predefined source term for the RMBK reactor maintained in an HPAC 
file.  The Moderate accident option uses a source term based on a steady-state reactor 
power of 2700 MW(t) and a long duration release, and the Severe accident option uses a 
source term based on a steady-state reactor power of 2775 MW(t) and a short duration 
release.  A release defined as short duration puts more activity in the atmosphere 
following the accident, while a long duration results in less activity being released due to 
radioactive decay of material while it is being held-up in the reactor core.  These two 
options were two of the seven source term specifications modeled in this research.  The 
other five, available in NFAC when the analyst uses the Technical Analysis vice the 
Operational option, are discussed next. 
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Figure 18.  Operational Mode Dialog Box 
  
When the analyst selects the What button in the Incident Summary window 
(Figure 16) with the Technical Analysis radio button selected, the Source Term dialog 
box appears (Figure 19).  This option gives the user more control over the specifics of the 
source term.  For the RBMK reactor, the analyst selects from one of six options in 
defining the source term.  Other reactor designs may have different options available.  
For example, a light water reactor (LWR) also has an option of Containment Monitor 
Reading to define the source term based on the reading from a radiation monitor located 
inside the containment.  Depending on the option selected, different dialog boxes appear 
when the Continue… button is pressed.  Of the six source term specifications listed in 
Figure 19, only the Isotopic Concentrations was not used in this research because it 
required specifying an activity per unit mass or volume of released material, information 
not available in the Chornobyl literature.  The other five source term specifications 
available in the Technical Analysis option are discussed below. 
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Figure 19.  Source Term Dialog Box 
 
Isotopic Release Rates 
This source term specification allows the user to specify a release rate for any of 
the 1040 nuclides maintained in the HPAC database.  The ATMES report provided a 
detailed source term for I-131 and Cs-137 (see Table 3 on page 20).  Because of how 
NFAC handles Cs-137 releases, only I-131 was used.  (For Cs-137, NFAC takes into 
account its short-lived daughter product, barium-137m (Ba-137m), and assumes they are 
in equilibrium since it grows-in quickly.  The resulting source term calculation releases 
twice as much activity to account for the activity contributed by Ba-137m).  Figures 20 
and 21 display the dialog boxes the analyst uses to select the atom of interest and the 
specific radioisotope in order to specify a release rate. 
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Figure 21.  Edit Iodine Dialog Box 
 
Percent Inventory 
 The Percent Inventory source term specification lets the analyst specify the 
percent of the total inventory released for each of 12 categories of isotopes, for up to five 
release periods.  Figure 22 displays the Time Dependent Percent Total Inventory dialog 
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box.  The analyst can enter different percentages for each time period and vary the length 
of each of the five time periods.  The total of the percentages in all the releases cannot 
exceed 100.  The analyst also specifies the reactor power level.  NFAC uses this value to 
determine the total core inventory.  (How the power level is used for determining the core 
inventory is discussed in the NFAC Source Term Estimation for the RMBK Reactor 
subsection of this chapter beginning on page 46.) 
 
Figure 22.  Time Dependent Percent Total Inventory Dialog Box 
 
Mix Specified by Analyst 
 In this source term specification the analyst provides a gross release rate for the 
accident (Figure 23) and what percentage of the core inventory is released from each of 
the 12 categories of isotopes listed in Figure 24.  To determine the core inventory, a 
default reactor power level of 2775 MW(t) is used by this source term specification for 
the RBMK reactor. 
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Figure 23.  Mix Specified By Analyst Dialog Box 
 
 
Figure 24.  Release Percents Dialog Box 
 
Plant Conditions 
A condition unique to the RBMK reactor is that of a prompt critical power 
excursion, a sudden increase in reactivity that causes the power to rise promptly, resulting 
in intense steam formation, an abrupt increase in pressure, and subsequent steam 
explosion that shatters the reactor.  This is one of three release pathways available for the 
plant conditions, displayed in Figure 25.  The other two release pathways, Confinement 
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Leakage/Failure and Confinement Bypass, were not applicable in describing the release 
pathway for the Chornobyl accident and therefore were not used. 
 
Figure 25.  Release Pathway Dialog Box 
  
When the Prompt Critical Power Excursion plant condition is selected the user 
has to provide the representative operating power and core involvement in the accident 
(Figure 26).  The representative operating power is the steady-state power of the reactor 
prior to shutdown.  The design of the RBMK reactor allows for on-line refueling and 
shutdown of a portion of the reactor.  Thus the option to select the core involvement is 
included. 
 
Figure 26.  Prompt Critical Power Excursion Dialog Box 
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External Rad File 
 The External Rad File specification allows the analyst to import a source term 
computed by a different model or prepared by the user in a text editor.  The advantage of 
the external Rad file is that the analyst can provide more detailed information about the 
release than NFAC can in computing the Rad file internally.  Appendix A provides 
information on the Rad file preparation.  This completes the discussion of the source term 
specifications in defining the “what” of the accident. 
 Figure 27 shows the Events dialog box that allows the user to define the “when” 
of the accident.  Depending on the options selected in defining the “where” and “what” of 
the accident, the user may not be able to define all five of the times used to describe an 
accident.  For example, the Chornobyl reactor did not have a containment structure, 
therefore a Release to Containment/Confinement time cannot be specified; or, if an 
external Rad file is used, then the End of Release cannot be specified, and instead is  
 
Figure 27.  Events Dialog Box 
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calculated based on the Release to Environment time and the release duration specified 
by the user in the Rad file.  The End of Exposure time is the time when SCIPUFF will 
stop its calculations, including radioactive decay of the release. 
The final button available in the Incident Summary window (Figure 16) is the 
Options button.  The Calculation Options dialog box is shown at Figure 28.  The user 
may enter additional information relating to the NFAC incident.  Of special note is the 
Release Height option.  In the case of the Chornobyl accident, the radioactive plume was 
injected into the atmosphere before it began following the ambient air motion.  For 
example, the ATMES source term gives a release height that varied from 300-1500 
meters during the release [Klug, et al.:358].  NFAC only allows one release height value 
for the duration of the release.  The Calculation Radius option sets the radius from the 
reactor for which SCIPUFF will conduct transport and dispersion calculations.  This  
 
Figure 28.  Calculation Options Dialog Box 
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is one of two ways to select the spatial domain.  The other is available in the Advanced 
edit mode and will be discussed as part of Figure 30 (page 42).  The Cloud Dose selection 
allows the analyst to choose how the dose from the radioactive cloud is computed.  The 
Cloud Shine option is more accurate than the Air Submersion option. 
When the Weather button is selected in the New Project Editor window (Figure 
13 on page 29) the Weather Editor window opens.  Figure 29 shows the Weather Editor.   
 
Figure 29.  WEATHER Editor Window 
 
HPAC supports several weather data formats.  For this research, upper air profile and 
surface observation data were obtained from AFCCC and prepared in the necessary 
format.  Appendix B provides further information on the weather files used.  
Once an incident is defined in the operational edit mode, the analyst can toggle to 
the Advanced edit mode.  Figure 30 shows the New PROJECT Editor window when the 
Advanced edit mode is selected.  This edit mode allows the analyst to refine incident 
parameters set as defaults in the Operational edit mode.  The Release… and Material… 
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buttons allow the analyst to view or edit the release and material data that are calculated 
after the analyst specifies the “what” of the accident.  The Time… and Domain… buttons 
provide “when” and “where” information, respectively, and can also be edited.  The 
Audit… button allows the analyst to view or edit information that was input at the start of 
the project in the New Project Setup dialog box (Figure 12 on page 28).  For this research 
two parameters that were changed were the spatial domain and the intervals of the 
SCIPUFF outputs.  Radiation from the Chornobyl accident was measured across Europe, 
 
Figure 30.  New PROJECT Editor Window (Advanced Mode) 
 
so the spatial domain was changed to encompass Europe in order for SCIPUFF to 
perform calculations throughout Europe.  This is the second way an analyst can define 
the spatial domain; the first is specifying the Calculation Radius in Figure 28.  
Once the user has defined the project, the Create Project button on the New 
PROJECT Editor window is pressed to begin the transport and dispersion of the source 
term.  Figure 31 shows the SCIPUFF Run Control window that provides a status of how 
 42  
 
far along the program is in performing its calculations.  For this research, SCIPUFF 
calculations took upwards of 3 hours when HPAC was run in standard mode.  Fast mode 
runs took one-third to one-half the time. 
Following completion of the SCIPUFF calculations the Plot Control window 
(Figure 32) is automatically displayed to allow the analyst to view customized plots.  The 
Plot Control window also allows analysts to copy plots to the Windows Clipboard;  
 
Figure 31.  SCIPUFF Run Control Window 
 
 
export images as bitmap files; animate a series of plots over the calculated output 
interval; and get dose and dose rate information at specific geographic locations, saving 
the data to an ASCII text file as a table. 
Description of NFAC Material 
NFAC materials are defined as either a depositing gas or a non-depositing gas for the 
purposing of transporting in SCIPUFF.  Releases from an accident that take the form of a  
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Figure 32.  Plot Control Window 
gas can be represented as depositing and/or non-depositing gas NFAC materials.   
Particulate releases are represented as a depositing gas NFAC material.  An early design 
decision made all NFAC materials 1 micron in diameter because of the uncertainty in 
determining the size of particles released in a reactor accident [Sjoreen, 2001b].  Because 
of this limitation the analyst cannot define a particle size distribution for transport in 
SCIPUFF.  Since most of the released radioactive material from the Chornobyl accident 
was in particulate form, an analyst might expect the performance of the HPAC software 
to be hindered. 
Limitations in Plotting Output Data 
HPAC is limited to 101 time displays in the plot window.  This must be taken into 
account when recording output from the SCIPUFF runs involving several days of 
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transport and dispersion.  For modeling purposes, the release began at 21:00 GMT on 25 
April, and ended at 21:00 GMT on 6 May.  The 11 days of transport required recording 
outputs every three hours, which resulted in recording 88 outputs.  Changing the output 
intervals does not affect the calculations, but does change the times at which the results 
are available for the analyst to plot.  Most of the observed measurements of I-131 air 
concentrations that will be discussed in Chapter IV were taken at times that were 
available for plotting.  Those times fell on the three-hour intervals for the outputs.  
However, measurements taken at different times required plotting the output of the 
nearest time.  There was never more than an hour difference between the observed 
measurement time and the HPAC plotted time. 
Use of Weather Files 
The Air Force Combat Climatology Center (AFCCC) provided the weather data.  
It consisted of upper air profile and surface observation data files.  The upper air profile 
data was obtained at six-hour intervals beginning at 18:00 GMT on 25 April, and ending 
at 06:00 GMT on 7 May.  Although it varied from time period to time period, there were 
about 119 observations taken each time period.  The observation points were scattered 
throughout Europe, with the greatest concentration located in the west.  The surface 
observation data had much greater spatial and temporal densities.  Upwards of 400 
weather stations provided surface data for the domain of the research, and readings were 
recorded as often as every 15 minutes for a few of the stations.  Since HPAC can only 
process up to 400 surface observation data points per time interval, selected surface 
observations from the southwestern corner of Europe were deleted, since this area was 
least affected by the transport of radioactive material during the release period.  
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Typically, surface observation data alone are used only when dealing with small domains 
(less than 200 km, or releases that do not exceed 500 m AGL).  Upper air profile data are 
used when the domain is on a continental scale and release heights are greater than 500 
m.  Upper air data typically contains data near ground level, thus surface observation data 
is not needed. 
This concludes the description of basic inputs into the NFAC module, and outputs 
from the HPAC software.  The remainder of the chapter will describe the source term 
estimation methodology employed by the NFAC incident model for an accident 
involving the RBMK reactor. 
NFAC Source Term Estimation for the RBMK Reactor 
 As with all the modules available in HPAC, NFAC is a source term model.  In 
modeling a nuclear facility accident it determines the activity of the radioisotopes 
released (the source term) based on user-provided conditions.  This source term is then 
transported through the atmosphere and dispersed via the SCIPUFF model in HPAC.  An 
alternative to having NFAC calculate the source term is for the user to define the material 
released by providing an isotopic release rate, a percent of the inventory released, or a 
customized external file (Rad file).  
NUREG-1228 describes the methodology for estimating the source term, and is 
supplemented with ORNL/TM-13309 for non-U.S. reactors.  For estimating the source 
term, the main difference between U.S. and non-U.S. reactors is the characterization of 
the systems and methods that act to reduce the released fission products from entering the 
environment [ORNL/TM-13309:2].  These differences are due to the availability of 
engineered safety systems, such as filters, sprays, containment structures and suppression 
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pools.  For example, rather than using a containment structure, the RBMK reactor uses an 
accident localization system. 
Catastrophic reactor accidents, by their very nature, make determining the source 
term very difficult.  The result is that for a severe accident “there is little hope of actually 
predicting the source term; only approximations of the source term with large 
uncertainties can be produced” [NUREG-1228, Ch. 1:2].  With this in mind, the 
remainder of the chapter presents information on how NFAC predicts the source term for 
an accident involving the RBMK reactor. 
Table 6 gives the seven methods by which the source term can be specified in 
NFAC for the RBMK reactor.  Which method to use depends on the type(s) of 
information known about the accident.  The first five are considered user-defined source 
terms because the user specifies the material and how it is released.  The remaining two 
are considered NFAC-generated source terms because the user does not specify what is 
released, but instead indicates the condition of the plant or the severity of the accident.  
NFAC then calculates the source term based on the user’s input regarding the accident 
condition.  
NUREG-1228 outlines a four-step process for estimating the accident source 
term.  The first step is to determine the reactor inventory of fission products.  Based on 
the Chornobyl accident, Morris of ORNL developed a specific plant inventory for an 
RBMK reactor [Sjoreen, 2001a].  The inventory file is an ACSII text file named 
CHERNOBL.1T4.  The 1T4 extension was to remind HPAC developers the inventory file 
was for reactors 1 to 4 [Sjoreen, 2001a]. 
 
 47  
 
Table 6.  NFAC Source Term Specification 
Method of Source Term 
Calculation Description of Method 
Isotopic Release Rates Specify the amount of radioactivity released per unit time 
for any of 1040 radionuclides 
Isotopic Concentrations Specify the amount of radioactivity released per unit 
volume of material released and the release rate of the 
unit volume for any of the 1040 radionuclides 
Percent Inventory Specify the percent of the core inventory released, 
varying the release over 5 release start times (NFAC 
limited) 
Mix Specified by Analyst Gross release rate is specified, e.g. 1 MCi over 1 hour, 
and composition of the release is then specified 
External RAD file Source term and dose factors are computed external to 
HPAC software 
Plant Conditions Accident conditions are known; e.g. prompt critical 
power excursion 
Operational Accident is classified as a Moderate or Severe accident 




The inventory is expressed in Ci/MW(t), so that the specific inventory is 
calculated by multiplying the inventory values by the long-term steady-state thermal 
power level of the reactor at the time of the accident.  Table 7 lists the inventory of the 
reactor for some of the prominent radionuclides, as well as the specific inventory of the 
radionuclides given a long-term steady-state power level of 2775 MW(t).  This power 
level value is used by NFAC for the Severe accident option available in the Operational 
mode for defining the source term.  The radionuclides listed are typical of the ones 
provided by agencies that estimated the core inventory of the RBMK reactor at the time 
of the Chornobyl accident, thus making comparisons between inventories developed by 
different agencies easier.  The specific inventory that was determined using the power 
rating for a Severe accident compares favorably with estimates presented in Chapter II 
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Inventory for 2775 
MW(t) Power  
Level (Ci) 
Core Inventory 
from Table 2 on 
Page 19 (Ci) 
  Kr-85       3.10E+02           8.60E+05          8.92E+05 
  Xe-133       4.89E+04           1.36E+08          1.76E+08 
  I-131       2.35E+04           6.50E+07          3.51E+07 
  Te-132       3.36E+04           9.32E+07          8.65E+06 
  Cs-134       2.66E+03           7.38E+06          5.14E+06 
  Cs-137       3.32E+03           8.94E+06          1.77E+07 
  Mo-99       4.44E+04           1.23E+08          1.30E+08 
  Zr-95       4.17E+04           1.16E+08          1.19E+08 
  Ru-103       3.59E+04           9.96E+07          1.11E+08 
  Ru-106       1.24E+04           3.44E+07          5.68E+07 
  Ba-140       4.23E+04           1.17E+08          7.84E+07 
  Ce-141       4.02E+04           1.12E+08          1.19E+08 
  Ce-144       3.20E+04           8.88E+07          8.65E+07 
  Sr-89       2.45E+04           6.80E+07          5.41E+07 
  Sr-90       2.50E+03           6.94E+06          5.41E+06 
  Np-239       4.64E+04           1.29E+08               N/A 
  Pu-238       3.41E+01           9.46E+04          2.70E+04 
  Pu-239       8.68E+00           2.41E+04          2.16E+04 
  Pu-240       1.73E+01           4.80E+04          2.70E+04 
  Pu-241       2.88E+03           7.99E+06          4.59E+06 
  Cm-242       9.50E+02           2.64E+06          7.03E+05 
 
 
(see Table 2 on page 19), indicating that 2775 MW(t) is a good estimate of the long-term 
steady-state power level prior to the shutdown of the reactor. 
 The second step in determining the source term is to estimate the fraction of the 
inventory released from the core.  NUREG-1228 describes this for U.S. commercial 
reactors.  In compiling the HPAC worldwide database of reactors, ORNL developed the 
plant damage conditions and source term characterizations for non-U.S. commercial 
reactors to supplement NUREG-1228.  These are documented in ORNL/TM-13309.   
Table 8 gives examples of the release fractions for core accidents involving the RBMK.  
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The values originate from NRC studies of reactors and accidents.  The first three core 
conditions are based on a Western-designed BWR and are similarly named [Morris:5].   
Table 8.  Select Release Fractions for RBMK Core Conditions 
Core Condition Severity Definition Fission Product Fraction Released From Core 
Gap Failure Core uncovered less 
than 30 minutes 
Noble gases, Cs, I 0.05 
In-Cavity Tube 
Rupture 
Core uncovered more 
than 30 minutes/less 







































of reactivity involving 
total core 
Noble gases 
I, Te, Sb 
Cs 
Ba, Sr 








                                                                                       Source:  ORNL/TM-13309. 
 
The Prompt Critical Power Excursion was determined from studying the Chornobyl 
accident [Morris:5].  However, note that for the Prompt Critical Power Excursion 60% of 
all the iodine is released from the core.  In contrast, the best current estimate for the 
Chornobyl release is 20% (see Table 2 on page 19).   
The third step in predicting the source term is to estimate what fraction of the 
remaining source term is removed on the way to the environment.  Reduction 
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mechanisms that are capable of removing fission products include particulate filters, 
pools of water, sprays, and natural processes [NUREG-1228, 1988, Chap 1:10].  
However, none of these reduction mechanisms are available for the Chornobyl source 
term.  Since the reactor building was constructed to industrial standards, with thin steel 
walls and roof, and not to Western-standards with thick reinforced concrete containment, 
the explosive forces allowed for radioisotopes to immediately enter the environment 
rather than be held-up and decay. 
 The final step in predicting the source term is to estimate the amount of the 
available fission product inventory with potential for release to the environment.  Again, 
because of the design of the RBMK reactor, all fission products with potential for release 
to the environment are released. 








                       (1) 
for each radionuclide i and n reduction mechanisms, where 
 
 SourceTermi = activity of radionuclide i contributing to the source term  (Ci) 
 FPIi = fission product core inventory of radionuclide i normalized to power   
(Ci/MW(t)) 
 PowerLevel = long-term steady-state power level at time of the accident  (MW(t)) 
CRFi = fraction of radionuclide i released from the core 
RDFi = fraction of radionuclide i released from the core remaining after n  
reduction mechanisms 
 EFi = fraction of radionuclide i remaining after the n reduction mechanisms that is  
released to the environment 
 
Examples of core release fraction (CRF) values for various radionuclides are given in 
Table 8 (page 50).  The assumption that the total effectiveness of the RDFs can be 
estimated by multiplying them together is suspect [NUREG-1228, Chap 4:2].  This is 
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because the various reduction mechanisms (e.g. pools of water, sprays, or natural 
processes) may be acting on the same form of a radionuclide [NUREG-1228, Chap 4:2].  
Although this is a concern for most reactor designs, for the Chornobyl accident there 
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IV.  Results and Data Comparisons 
 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the tests performed using the HPAC 
software.  The results of the HPAC tests are then displayed in data tables and contour 
plots.  A discussion of how these results compared with the measured data, and how the 
overall HPAC predictions compared with select models studied in the ATMES report is 
presented. 
Tests Performed and Test Matrix 
The test runs performed in this research are listed in Table 9.  They are divided 
into two distinct groups.  The first group of tests is prefixed with an “N” in Table 9 and is 
used to identify NFAC-generated source terms.  The second group is prefixed with a “U” 
to identify the tests as user-generated source terms.  Except when noted in the table, the 
default input parameters for the tests included a stack height of 300 meters, the standard 
run mode, measurement of the I-131 air concentration at 2 meters above the ground, and 
a 2775 MW(t) power level.  
The NFAC-generated source term runs primarily served as a “what if” test to 
determine how well the HPAC software would predict the Chornobyl accident if it was to 
happen now.  For this scenario the analyst would not have any detailed information 
concerning the activity released and thus would use the software to generate the source 
term.  These runs used the actual weather data for Europe that was provided by AFCCC.  
Even though actual long-term, detailed weather data would probably not be available for 
the analyst if an accident has just occurred, the AFCCC archived weather is used here to 
limit/eliminate poor weather data as a source of error in the predictions.  (The analyst 
would be able to get forecast data from the DTRA meteorological data server.) 
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N-1A Plant conditions, prompt 
critical power excursion, 
total core 
4/25 2100 to 
5/6 2100 
39.1 MCi Upper air 
and surface 
 
N-1B Plant conditions, prompt 
critical power excursion, 
total core 
4/25 2100 to 
5/6 2100 
45.2 MCi Upper air 
and surface 
3200 MW(t) power 
level 
N-2 Severe accident 4/25 2100 to 
4/27 0300 
44.2 MCi Upper air 
and surface 
 
N-3 Moderate accident 4/25 2100 to 
4/27 1500 
17.9 MCi Upper air 
and surface 
 
N-4 See N-3 See N-3 See N-3 See N-3 
 
fast mode 
U-1 Isotopic release rate, 
4.77E+04 Ci/hr 
4/25 2100 to 
5/6 2100 
12.6 MCi Upper air 
and surface 
 
U-2A External Rad file 4/25 2100 to 
5/6 2100 
12.6 MCi Upper air 
and surface 
ATMES source term 
U-2B External Rad file 4/25 2100 to 
5/6 2100 
12.6 MCi Upper air 
and surface 
ATMES source term, 
600 meter release 
height 
U-3 Mix specified by analyst, 
20% of core I-131 released 
4/25 2100 to 
5/6 2100 
7.0 MCi Upper air 
and surface 
 
U-4A Percent Inventory, TDST, 
20.0% of core I-131 
released 
4/25 2100 to 
4/30 2100 
12.6 MCi Upper air 
and surface 
ATMES source term 
grouped into five 
time periods 
U-4B Percent Inventory, TDST, 
20.0% of core I-131 
released 
4/25 2100 to 
4/30 2100 
12.6 MCi Upper air 
and surface 
600 meter release 
height 
U-5 See U-2A See U-2A See U-2A Upper air 
Climatology 
See U-2A 
U-6 See U-2A See U-2A See U-2A See U-2A 
 
fast mode 





The user-defined source terms were run using source term data from the 
Chornobyl literature.  Since detailed source term data is usually not available until an 
accident has been thoroughly studied, the user-defined source term runs offered the 
opportunity to determine how well the software predicts the actual air concentration data.  
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The ATMES report provided the most detailed source term.  It was used to calculate the 
release rate of I-131 for the U-1 and U-3 runs, prepare an external RAD file for the U-2 
series of data runs, and define five releases for the U-4 series. 
Data Used in Comparisons 
As previously discussed, I-131 is the most important short-lived radionuclide to 
consider in the release from the Chornobyl accident since it, along with Cs-137, is 
responsible for most of the radiation exposure received by the general population.  The 
Commission of the European Communities (CEC, also referred to as EC, European 
Community) maintains data collected from the accident at the Joint Research Center 
(JRC) in Ispra, Italy.  Data collected for I-131 was published in the CEC Report EUR 
12800 EN [Graziani, et al.].  This dataset was used in the ATMES study for comparison 
of the 21 model participants’ results.  Table 10 displays the measured air concentration 
values used in this research, and Figure 33 displays the location of the monitoring sites 
listed in Table 10.  Chornobyl’s location is identified with the ∇  symbol. (The 
concentration measurements in Table 10 display are unedited from the data provided by 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [Foster, K].)  Note from Figure 33 the absence 
of monitoring sites inside the former Soviet Union.  Research efforts to obtain I-131 air 
concentration data inside the former Soviet Union were unsuccessful.  HPAC predictions 
are compared to each point in the measured values to determine the factor the prediction 




____ =                           (2) 
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Figure 33.  Location of Air Concentration Measurements 
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Results of NFAC Generated I-131 Source Terms 
 The NFAC-generated source term data runs served as a performance evaluation of 
the software as if the Chornobyl accident was ongoing and no detailed information about 
the source term was available.  (If the source term were known the analyst would be best 
served using the user-generated source term specifications, which are discussed 
beginning on page 59.)  For this set of runs the analyst is able to select from three 
available options:  Plant Conditions, Moderate or Severe accident. 
Plant Conditions Source Term 
Using the Plant Conditions specification, the analyst is able to select the Prompt 
Critical Power Excursion option, representing how the Chornobyl accident occurred.  
Two runs were conducted using this option.  The first used the default input parameters 
previously discussed (N-1A).  A second test was run to determine the effects of 
increasing the power level (N-1B).  Increasing the power level from 2775 MW(t) to 3200 
MW(t) (the full-power rating of the reactor) would generate a larger core inventory, using 
the methodology discussed in Chapter III.  Tables 11 and 12 display the results from data 
runs N-1A and N-1B, respectively. 
Severe Accident Source Term 
The Severe accident option is one of the two options available when the analyst 
selects the Operational Mode specification.  It is characterized by a large release of 
activity over a short-duration time period.  NFAC uses a built-in source term file named 
acsrbmk to define the Severe accident condition, which uses a reactor power level of 
2775 MW(t).  The default release period for the built-in Severe accident condition is 30 
hours.  The results for this run (N-2) are displayed in Table 13. 
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Table 11.  I-131 Air Concentration for Plant Conditions at 2775 MW(t)  (N-1A) 































Paris 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 5.47E-18 7E-16 4.28E-03 0.15 
Mol 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 4.73E-08 2E-08 5.12E-02 0.06 1.41E+01 141 
Aachen 0.00E+00 N/A 0.00E+00 0.00 9.81E-02 0.04 4.78E-01 0.70 4.12E+01 557 
Monaco 0.00E+00 0.00 1.23E-09 9E-10 5.58E-02 0.02 6.92E-02 0.02 9.88E-02 0.08 
Ispra 0.00E+00 0.00 2.55E-02 0.002 8.42E-01 0.10 1.54E+00 0.71 6.18E+00 8.24 
Berlin 3.60E+00 4.24 6.38E+00 70.89 1.68E+02 781 4.03E+03 4950 2.42E+05 5E+05 
Hannover 4.00E-09 4E-06 6.44E-16 4E-14 1.32E+00 3.39 7.42E+01 118 6.34E+02 1428 
Stockholm 3.61E-02 0.49 3.61E-02 0.62 1.06E-01 2.55 7.37E+01 3150 2.04E+00 22.37 
Bratislava 1.36E+02 9.44 4.04E+03 824 6.28E+04 6E+04 1.66E+05 3E+04 1.76E+06 2E+05 
Budapest 1.21E+03 637 3.61E-02 0.01 3.40E+05 5E+05 9.11E+05 6E+05 8.54E+06 1E+07 
Thessalonika 5.59E-03 N/A 1.83E+01 N/A 1.86E+03 9300 1.39E+04 9929 1.85E+05 4E+04 
Helsinki 3.06E+01 46.36 3.06E+01 29.71 3.08E+01 38.99 3.24E+01 64.80 3.43E+01 111 
Fraction that fall 
within a factor of 
100 (F100) 




Table 12.  I-131 Air Concentration for Plant Conditions at 3200 MW(t) (N-1B) 































Paris 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 5.57E-18 7E-16 4.94E-03 0.15 
Mol 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 1.67E-07 8E-08 5.89E-02 0.07 1.63E+01 161 
Aachen 0.00E+00 N/A 0.00E+00 0.00 1.13E-01 0.05 5.51E-01 0.81 4.76E+01 643 
Monaco 0.00E+00 0.00 1.00E-09 7E-10 6.43E-02 0.02 7.97E-02 0.03 1.41E-01 0.10 
Ispra 0.00E+00 0.00 2.94E-01 0.02 9.71E-01 0.11 1.77E+00 0.81 1.45E-01 0.19 
Berlin 4.16E+00 4.89 7.35E+00 81.67 1.93E+02 898 4.65E+03 5712 7.13+05 1E+06 
Hannover 4.38E-09 4E-06 6.74E-16 4E-14 1.52E+00 3.91 8.55E+01 136 7.31E+02 1646 
Stockholm 4.16E-02 0.57 4.16E-02 0.71 1.22E-01 2.93 8.50E+00 363 2.36E+00 25.88 
Bratislava 1.57E+02 10.90 4.66E+03 951 5.96E+04 6E+04 1.68E+05 3E+04 2.03E+06 2E+06 
Budapest 1.40E+03 737 4.37E+04 1E+04 6.48E+04 9E+04 1.05E+06 7E+05 9.85E+06 2E+07 
Thessalonika 6.44E-03 N/A 2.11E+01 N/A 2.15E+03 1E+04 1.60E+04 1E+04 2.14E+05 4E+04 
Helsinki 3.52E+01 53.33 3.52E+01 34.17 3.55E+01 44.94 3.77E+01 75.40 3.97E+01 128 
Fraction that fall 
within a factor of 
100 (F100) 
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Table 13.  I-131 Air Concentration for Severe Accident (N-2) 































Paris 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 4.53E-13 3E-12 7.51E-11 9E-09 3.04E-03 0.09 
Mol 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 3.53E-02 0.02 1.33E-01 0.16 6.32E+00 84.41 
Aachen 0.00E+00 N/A 1.95E-16 2E-16 2.08E-01 0.01 4.06E-01 0.59 1.30E+01 177 
Monaco 0.00E+00 0.00 1.18E-03 8E-04 2.45E-02 0.008 2.75E-02 0.01 3.07E-02 0.02 
Ispra 2.30E-17 2E-17 1.69E-01 0.01 2.13E-01 0.02 2.65E-01 0.12 4.09E-01 0.55 
Berlin 4.85E-01 0.57 9.72E-01 10.80 7.69E+01 358 1.10E+03 1351 1.18E+04 2E+04 
Hannover 1.16E-08 1E-05 2.66E-04 0.01 1.26E+00 3.24 4.05E+01 64.39 1.24E+03 2793 
Stockholm 1.18E-02 0.16 1.18E-02 0.20 1.28E-01 3.08 4.54E+00 194 1.51E+00 16.06 
Bratislava 6.01E01 4.17 5.76E+02 118 3.68E+03 3680 8.06E+03 1465 1.85E+04 2E+04 
Budapest 3.69E+02 194 3.56E+03 868 1.17E+04 2E+04 2.10E+04 1E+04 3.97E+04 9E+04 
Thessalonika 1.06E-02 N/A 7.03E-01 N/A 8.84E+00 44.20 4.43E+01 31.64 1.54E+02 30.20 
Helsinki 3.37E+00 5.11 3.38E+00 3.28 3.56E+00 4.51 3.74E+00 7.48 3.75E+00 12.10 
Fraction that fall 
within a factor of 
100 (F100) 
 0.40  0.45  0.58  0.58  0.58 
 
 
Moderate Accident Source Term 
The Moderate accident option is the other option available when the analyst 
selects the Operational Mode specification.  It is characterized by a lesser release of 
activity over a longer period of time than the Severe accident option.  NFAC uses a built-
in source term file named acmrbmk to define the Moderate accident conditions, which 
uses a reactor power level of 2700 MW(t).  The default release period for the Moderate 
accident condition is 42 hours. Table 14 displays the results for this run (N-3). 
Results of User Defined I-131 Source Terms 
 User-defined source terms are available using the Isotopic Release Rates, 
Percent Inventory, Mix Specified by Analyst, and External Rad File specifications.  These 
specifications should better model the Chornobyl accident than the NFAC-generated 
source terms, because they allow analyst control of the source term. 
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Table 14.  I-131 Air Concentration for Moderate Accident (N-3) 































Paris 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 1.21E-18 4E-17 
Mol 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 6.18E-07 6E-06 
Aachen 0.00E+00 N/A 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 2.40E-04 0.003 
Monaco 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 7.66E-17 3E-17 4.53E-13 3E-13 
Ispra 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 2.12E-16 2E-17 4.74E-10 2E-10 1.24E-05 2E-05 
Berlin 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 5.44E-10 3E-09 4.03E-04 5E-04 1.50E-01 0.28 
Hannover 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 3.33E-09 5E-09 9.15E-03 0.02 
Stockholm 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 3.10E-12 1E-10 2.92E-05 3E-04 
Bratislava 3.85E-06 3E-07 2.60E-03 0.001 9.04E-02 0.09 4.08E-01 0.07 4.74E+00 3.95 
Budapest 1.22E-03 0.001 1.25E-01 0.03 1.45E+00 1.93 4.58E+00 2.86 2.83E+01 67.38 
Thessalonika 0.00E+00 N/A 6.55E-04 N/A 8.94E-02 0.45 1.17E+00 0.84 9.32E+00 1.83 
Helsinki 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 5.00E-10 7E-10 4.61E-09 9E-09 2.20E-08 7E-08 
Fraction that fall 
within a factor of 
100 (F100) 
 0.00  0.09  0.25  0.25  0.42 
 
 
Isotopic Release Rate Source Term 
For this source term specification the analyst is able to specify an amount of 
activity to be released per unit time for each isotope contributing to the source term.  The 
ATMES source term specifies a release of 12.6 MCi of I-131.  For the eleven-day 
duration of the release, the linear release rate is then 4.77E+04 Ci/hr.  Although the 
Chornobyl source term is known to not have been a constant, linear release (see Figure 5 
on page 18), this specification is tested since this type of limited source term information 
may be what an analyst has available in the early stages of an accident.  The results of 
this run (U-1) are displayed in Table 15. 
External Rad File Source Term 
A Rad file is created by NFAC after the analyst has defined the incident.  It 
contains data for the activity released.  The information in the file is passed to SCIPUFF 
for transport and dispersion.  The analyst also has the capability to create a Rad file 
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Table 15.  I-131 Air Concentration for Isotopic Release Rate (U-1) 































Paris 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 1.55E-19 2E-17 4.48E-05 0.001 
Mol 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 9.51E-12 5E-12 4.02E-03 0.004 1.48E-01 1.48 
Aachen 0.00E+00 N/A 0.00E+00 0.00 9.39E-03 0.004 4.88E-02 0.07 4.31E-01 5.82 
Monaco 0.00E+00 0.00 7.19E-11 5E-11 5.81E-05 2E-05 7.22E-05 3E-05 1.03E-03 8E-04 
Ispra 0.00E+00 0.00 2.67E-04 2E-05 1.23E-02 0.001 2.26E-02 0.01 6.46E-02 0.09 
Berlin 3.77E-02 0.04 6.66E-02 0.74 1.75E+00 8.14 4.21E+01 51.72 4.85E+01 90.99 
Hannover 3.91E-14 4E-11 1.54E-16 9E-15 1.38E-02 0.04 7.75E-01 1.23 6.62E+01 149 
Stockholm 3.78E-03 0.05 3.78E-03 0.06 9.01E-03 0.22 7.70E-01 32.91 2.13E+00 23.36 
Bratislava 1.42E+00 0.10 4.22E+01 8.61 5.40E+02 540 1.74E+02 31.64 2.59E+03 2158 
Budapest 1.26E+01 6.63 3.96E-02 0.01 3.55E+03 4733 9.51E+03 5944 8.93E+04 2E+05 
Thessalonika 3.47E-05 N/A 1.91E-01 N/A 1.95E+01 97.5 1.45E+02 104 1.94E+03 380 
Helsinki 3.20E-01 0.48 3.20E-01 0.31 3.20E-01 0.41 3.43E-01 0.69 3.58E-01 1.15 
Fraction that fall 
within a factor of 
100 (F100) 
 0.50  0.45  0.42  0.58  0.50 
 
 
outside of NFAC.  The advantage is being able to provide SCIPUFF detailed information 
about the release.  The ATMES source term provides the detail needed to take advantage 
of this specification.  One of these detailed items is the height of release of the source 
term (see Table 3 on page 20).  Most of the release periods give a release height of 300 
meters.  However, the release height for the first 24 hours is 600 meters.  Since only a 
single release height can be given for an NFAC incident, two runs are conducted.  Table 
16 displays the U-2A results for the 300 meters release height, and Table 17 displays the 
U-2B results for the 600 meters release height. 
Mix Specified by Analyst Source Term  
This source term specification allows the analyst to provide a gross release rate of the 
activity and the percent of the total core inventory released in each of 12 categories of 
radionuclides.  Using the ATMES source term as a reference, the total release of I-131 
equates to a gross release rate of 7.4 Ci/sec.  With 20% of the I-131 core inventory 
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Table 16.  I-131 Air Concentration for External Rad File at 300m (U-2A) 































Paris 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 6.37E-14 2E-12 
Mol 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 7.57E-10 9E-10 3.69E-03 0.05 
Aachen 0.00E+00 N/A 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 1.94E-03 0.003 1.40E-03 0.02 
Monaco 0.00E+00 0.00 6.01E-15 4E-15 1.28E-10 3E-05 2.20E-10 8E-11 3.60E-10 3E-10 
Ispra 0.00E+00 0.00 8.15E-04 5E-05 1.44E-02 0.002 3.66E-02 0.02 1.11E-01 0.15 
Berlin 8.60E-03 0.01 1.65E-03 0.02 2.15E-02 0.10 6.57E-01 0.81 1.44E+01 27.0 
Hannover 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 1.38E-05 4E-05 4.66E-02 0.07 1.00 
Stockholm 9.05E-04 0.01 9.06E-04 0.02 1.82E-03 0.04 1.46E-03 0.06 6.41E-02 0.70 
Bratislava 2.67E+00 0.20 9.70E+00 2.00 1.31E+01 13.10 5.31E+01 9.65 5.49E+01 45.75 
Budapest 2.69E-01 0.14 9.78E+00 2.39 1.03E+01 13.70 4.14E+01 25.90 3.19E+02 760 
Thessalonika 3.20E-09 N/A 3.68E-03 N/A 7.35E-01 3.68 8.26E+00 5.90 6.93E+01 13.59 
Helsinki 8.10E-03 0.01 8.10E-03 0.008 8.12E-03 0.01 9.44E-03 0.02 1.02E-02 0.03 
Fraction that fall 
within a factor of 
100 (F100) 





Table 17.  I-131 Air Concentration for External Rad File at 600m (U-2B) 































Paris 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 9.88E-14 3E-12 
Mol 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 8.25E-10 1E-09 7.91E-03 0.08 
Aachen 0.00E+00 N/A 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 2.16E-03 0.003 2.85E-03 0.04 
Monaco 0.00E+00 0.00 4.47E-14 3E+03 1.59E-10 6E-11 2.44E-10 9E-11 4.56E-10 4E-10 
Ispra 0.00E+00 0.00 7.41E-04 5E-05 2.01E-02 0.002 4.27E-02 0.02 1.72E-01 0.23 
Berlin 1.06E-02 0.01 2.01E-03 0.02 2.62E-02 0.12 8.21E-01 1.01 2.11E+01 39.6 
Hannover 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 1.57E-02 0.04 5.70E-02 0.09 6.60E-01 1.49 
Stockholm 3.20E-04 0.004 3.20E-04 0.005 4.20E-04 0.01 2.12E-03 0.09 1.18E-01 1.29 
Bratislava 3.58E+00 0.25 1.64E+00 0.33 1.83E+01 18.30 6.73E+00 4.81 6.18E+01 51.50 
Budapest 3.66E-01 0.19 1.50E+01 3.68 1.44E+02 192 1.73E-02 3.46 3.84E+02 914 
Thessalonika 2.97E-08 N/A 6.49E-03 N/A 9.24E-01 4.62 1.04E+01 7.43 8.27E+01 16.21 
Helsinki 1.54E-02 0.02 1.54E-02 0.01 1.55E-02 0.02 1.70E-02 0.03 1.84E-02 0.06 
Fraction that fall 
within a factor of 
100 (F100) 
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released (taken from the Chornobyl literature), the total release for this test was 7.0 MCi.  
The results of the U-3 data run are displayed in Table 18. 
Table 18.  I-131 Air Concentration for Mix Specified by Analyst (U-3) 































Paris 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 2.50E-03 0.08 
Mol 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 6.92E-12 4E-12 2.45E-04 3E-04 8.24E-02 0.82 
Aachen 0.00E+00 N/A 0.00E+00 0.00 5.25E-05 2E-05 2.73E-02 0.04 2.41E-01 3.26 
Monaco 0.00E+00 0.00 5.60E-11 4E-11 3.26E-05 1E-05 4.04E-05 1E-05 5.76E-03 0.004 
Ispra 0.00E+00 0.00 2.44E-02 0.002 4.92E-01 0.06 8.99E-01 0.41 3.61E-01 0.48 
Berlin 2.10E-02 0.02 3.72E-02 0.41 9.79E-01 4.55 2.35E+01 28.87 2.71E+02 508 
Hannover 2.88E-14 3E-11 1.28E-16 7E-15 1.03E-02 0.03 4.33E-01 0.69 3.70E+01 83.33 
Stockholm 2.11E-03 0.03 2.11E-03 0.04 5.03E-03 0.12 4.30E-02 1.84 1.19E+00 13.05 
Bratislava 1.12E+00 0.08 2.35E+01 4.80 3.02E+01 30.20 8.52E+02 155 1.03E+03 858 
Budapest 7.06E+00 3.72 2.21E+02 53.90 1.98E+03 2640 5.31E+03 3319 4.98E+04 1E+05 
Thessalonika 1.97E-05 N/A 1.07E-01 N/A 1.09E+01 54.50 8.10E+01 57.86 1.08E+02 21.18 
Helsinki 1.78E-01 0.27 1.79E-01 0.17 1.79E-01 0.23 1.89E-01 0.38 2.00E-01 0.65 
Fraction that fall 
within a factor of 
100 (F100) 
 0.50  0.45  0.58  0.58  0.67 
 
 
Percent Inventory Source Term 
This source term specification allows the analyst to provide a source term that 
varies over time vice Isotopic Release Rate and Mix Specified by Analyst in which the 
analyst defines a single, continuous release for the duration of the release period.    
However, NFAC can only accept up to five time dependent source term (TDST) periods, 
limiting the degree of detail an analyst can specify within the source term.  For these two 
runs, the eleven releases of the ATMES source term were group into five releases, which 
accounted for the total release of 12.6 MCi.  As with the External Rad File specification 
runs, U-2A and U-2B, two runs using different release heights were conducted.  The 
results of the U-4A run, with a release height of 300 meters, are given in Table 19.  Table 
20 provides the results of the U-4B run, with a release height of 600 meters. 
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Table 19.  I-131 Air Concentration for Percent Inventory at 300m (U-4A) 































Paris 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 1.30E-03 0.04 
Mol 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 3.94E-13 2E-12 1.98E-03 0.002 2.74E+00 27.40 
Aachen 0.00E+00 N/A 0.00E+00 0.00 1.77E-06 9E-07 3.16E-02 0.05 8.30E+00 112 
Monaco 0.00E+00 0.00 1.55E-10 1E-10 6.93E-09 3E-09 1.08E-08 4E-09 9.09E-02 0.07 
Ispra 0.00E+00 0.00 2.01E-03 1E-04 8.49E-02 0.03 1.93E-01 0.09 3.07E+00 4.09 
Berlin 3.26E-01 0.38 6.45E-01 7.17 1.32E+01 1.50 3.42E+02 0.05 2.05E+04 4E+04 
Hannover 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 7.34E-02 0.34 5.44E+00 8.65 7.25E+02 1633 
Stockholm 6.12E-03 0.08 6.12E-03 0.10 9.49E-03 0.02 7.19E-01 30.73 3.03E+01 332 
Bratislava 2.10E+02 1.46 6.09E+02 124 6.67E+03 1E+04 1.77E+04 3218 1.15E+05 1E+05 
Budapest 2.12E+02 112 5.99E+03 1460 3.80E+04 5E+04 9.26E+04 6E+04 4.24E+05 1E+06 
Thessalonika 5.42E-03 N/A 6.76E+00 N/A 6.28E+02 3140 5.13E+03 3664 3.22E+04 6314 
Helsinki 6.37E+00 9.65 6.37E+00 6.18 6.40E+00 8.10 6.66E+00 13.32 7.00E+00 22.58 
Fraction that fall 
within a factor of 
100 (F100) 
 0.40  0.27  0.42  0.50  0.42 
 
 
Table 20.  I-131 Air Concentration for Percent Inventory at 600m (U-4B) 































Paris 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 1.56E-19 2E-17 2.50E-10 8E-09 
Mol 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 8.91E-04 0.001 2.26E+00 22.60 
Aachen 0.00E+00 N/A 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 1.80E-03 0.002 7.08E+00 95.68 
Monaco 0.00E+00 0.00 8.97E-11 6E-11 6.06E-09 2E-09 9.91E-09 4E-09 7.53E-02 0.06 
Ispra 0.00E+00 0.00 8.18E-04 5E-05 6.84E-02 0.008 1.69E-01 0.08 3.08E+00 4.11 
Berlin 2.09E-01 0.25 4.71E-01 5.23 9.61E+00 44.70 2.91E+02 357 2.11E+04 4E+04 
Hannover 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 3.42E-02 0.09 3.65E+00 5.80 5.58E+02 1256 
Stockholm 1.21E-02 0.17 1.21E-02 0.21 1.40E-02 0.34 5.92E-01 25.30 3.38E+01 371 
Bratislava 1.89E+01 1.31 6.13E+02 125 7.50E+03 7500 1.93E+04 3509 1.21E+04 1E+04 
Budapest 2.23E+02 118 6.78E+03 1654 4.66E+04 6E+04 1.10E+05 7E+04 4.77E+05 1E+06 
Thessalonika 3.91E-03 N/A 8.45E+00 N/A 9.47E+02 4735 6.59E+03 4707 3.91E+04 7667 
Helsinki 6.98E+00 10.58 6.98E+00 6.78 6.99E+00 8.85 7.22E+00 14.44 7.62E+00 2.46 
Fraction that fall 
within a factor of 
100 (F100) 
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Comparison of Climatological Data 
Although this research focuses on a previous accident with known consequences, 
most users of HPAC will need to analyze incidents that are just beginning, or have not 
yet occurred.  For such scenarios, detailed current or forecast weather data may not be 
readily available for the user.  Using the U-2A source term, an NFAC test using only the 
upper air profile climatology data was performed.  The run was labeled U-5 and the 
results are displayed in Table 21.  The air concentration contour plot of I-131 on 5 May 
for the U-5 run is displayed in Figure 34. 
Table 21.  I-131 Air Concentration for April Upper Air Climatology (U-5) 































Paris 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 4.15E-13 1E-11 
Mol 1.07E-06 0.01 1.07E-06 6E-07 1.07E-06 5E-07 1.46E-06 2E-06 7.15E-06 7E-05 
Aachen 2.07E-06 N/A 2.07E-06 1E-06 2.07E-06 9E-07 2.79E-06 4E-06 1.16E-05 2E-04 
Monaco 8.64E-15 6E-14 8.64E-15 6E-15 8.64E-15 3E-15 8.64E-15 3E-15 4.37E-08 3E-08 
Ispra 4.63E-08 3E-09 4.63E-08 3E-09 4.77E-08 5E-09 4.78E-08 2E-08 8.64E-07 1E-06 
Berlin 3.11E-01 0.37 3.36E-01 3.73 4.92E-01 2.29 5.14E-01 0.63 6.60E-01 1.24 
Hannover 7.06E-04 0.71 7.46E-04 0.04 7.97E-04 0.002 1.36E-03 0.002 1.99E-03 0.004 
Stockholm 1.58E+01 216 1.82E+01 311 1.84E+01 442 4.54E+01 1940 5.15E+01 565 
Bratislava 2.73E-01 0.02 2.74E-01 0.06 3.31E-01 0.33 3.57E-01 0.06 4.40E-01 0.37 
Budapest 5.14E-01 0.27 6.24E-01 0.15 6.86E-01 0.92 1.01E+00 0.63 1.03E+00 2.45 
Thessalonika 7.46E-05 N/A 7.62E-05 N/A 8.03E-05 4E-04 8.53E-05 6E-05 9.35E-05 2E-05 
Helsinki 8.06E+02 1220 9.75E+02 947 1.29E+03 1630 1.72E+03 3440 1.96E+03 6320 
Fraction that fall 
within a factor of 
100 (F100) 
 0.50  0.36  0.25  0.25  0.25 
 
 
Comparison of Standard Mode versus Fast Mode 
 The analyst has the option of having SCIPUFF run in the standard mode or the 
computationally less-intensive fast mode.  Although the HPAC manual states that the fast 
mode option is designed for scenarios involving a large number of nuclear weapons, the 
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Figure 34.  U-5 Hazard Plot of I-131 Air Concentration 
 
 
option is available in all incident models.  A previous research effort that studied the 
Three Mile Island accident found results obtained using the fast mode comparable to 
standard mode results [Frederick:62].  A comparison test is conducted to determine 
whether the standard mode versus fast mode outcome would be the same, given the larger 
spatial and temporal domain of this research.  Two runs were conducted using the fast 
mode setting, using one of the worse performing runs (N-3) and one of the best 
performing runs (U-2A).  The results of running the N-3 source term in fast mode is 
labeled as the N-4 run and are shown in Table 22 (Table 14 shows the results of the N-3 
source term run in standard mode). The results of running the U-2A source term in fast 
mode is labeled as the U-6 run and are shown in Table 23 (Table 16 shows the results of 
the U-2A source term run in standard mode).  The F100 values of the corresponding 
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standard mode runs are also displayed to allow for quick comparison.  Finally, the air 
concentration contour plot of I-131 on 5 May for the U-2A run is displayed in Figure 35, 
and the corresponding U-6 fast mode run in Figure 36.  A review of the .err files 
generated by HPAC shows that in fast mode SCIPUFF used 10-15% of the number of 
puffs as in the corresponding standard mode runs. 
Table 22.  I-131 Air Concentration for Moderate Accident in Fast Mode (N-4) 































Paris 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 
Mol 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 8.91E-11 9E-10 
Aachen 0.00E+00 N/A 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 2.71E-07 4E-06 
Monaco 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 4.67E-08 4E-08 
Ispra 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 8.65E-17 1E-17 5.92E-11 3E-11 1.10E-05 1E-05 
Berlin 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 1.52E-7 7E-07 1.39E-04 2E-04 5.11E-02 0.10 
Hannover 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 1.69E-09 3E-09 1.57E-04 4E-4 
Stockholm 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 7.24E-10 3E-08 4.67E-05 5E-04 
Bratislava 2.06E-04 1E-05 1.52E-03 3E-04 4.10E-02 0.04 1.88E-01 0.03 2.04E+00 1.70 
Budapest 4.45E-04 2E-04 6.68E-02 0.02 8.37E-01 1.12 2.53E+00 1.58 1.44E+01 34.29 
Thessalonika 0.00E+00 N/A 7.12E-04 N/A 9.03E-02 0.45 8.29E-01 0.59 5.59E+01 10.96 
Helsinki 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 6.29E-10 8E-10 6.82E-09 1E-08 7.01E-06 2E-05 
Fraction that fall 
within a factor of 
100 (F100) 
 0.00  0.09  0.25  0.25  0.33 
F100 values for N-3 
source term 
(Standard Mode run) 
 0.00  0.09  0.25  0.25  0.42 
 
 
Comparison of Results Using a Reduced Spatial Domain 
The previous data runs used a spatial domain covering Europe.  As will be 
pointed out in the results, a general observation of all the runs was that monitoring sites 
closer to Chornobyl provided better predictions than did the monitoring sites farther 
away.  Using the U-2A data run as the input, a run was conducted changing the spatial 
domain from all of Europe to one that encompassed but did not extend much farther  
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Table 23.  I-131 Air Concentration for Mix Specified by Analyst in Fast Mode (U-6) 































Paris 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 
Mol 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 1.42E-09 1E-08 
Aachen 0.00E+00 N/A 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 2.18E-05 3E-04 
Monaco 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 
Ispra 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 4.98E-16 6E-17 0.00E+00 0.00 3.60E-17 5E-17 
Berlin 9.80E-05 1E-04 9.80E-05 0.001 1.31E-04 6E-04 2.57E-01 0.32 3.96E+01 74.25 
Hannover 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 0.00 2.06E-04 3E-04 1.26E+01 0.28 
Stockholm 4.94E-05 7E-04 4.94E-05 8E-04 4.94E-05 0.001 2.05E-04 0.009 7.67E-02 0.84 
Bratislava 9.47E-04 7E-05 3.05E-02 0.0006 1.27E+00 1.27 2.55E+01 4.64 3.28E+02 273 
Budapest 2.33E-02 0.01 2.22E+00 0.54 2.22E+00 2.96 3.24E+02 2.03 2.52E+03 6000 
Thessalonika 4.29E-08 N/A 3.01E-02 N/A 1.07E+00 5.35 1.39E+01 9.93 1.07E+02 20.98 
Helsinki 3.31E-02 0.05 3.31E_02 0.03 3.31E-02 0.04 3.31E-02 0.07 3.40E-02 0.11 
Fraction that fall 
within a factor of 
100 (F100) 
 0.20  0.18  0.33  0.33  0.42 
F100 values for U-
2A source term 
(Standard 
Mode run) 
 0.50  0.36  0.50  0.67  0.75 
 
 
beyond the three closest monitoring sites.  The results of the reduced spatial domain data 
run are displayed in Table 24.  The air concentration plot of the reduced spatial domain 
data run is displayed in Figure 37. 
Table 24.  Air Concentration for Reduced Domain (U-7) 































Stockholm 9.68E-04 0.01 9.68E-04 0.02 9.68E-04 0.02 9.78E-04 0.04 1.03E-03 0.01 
Budapest 2.60E+00 1.37 3.49E+01 8.51 8.90E+01 119 1.35E+02 84.38 1.73E+02 412 
Helsinki 5.92E-02 0.09 5.92E-02 0.06 5.92E-02 0.07 5.92E-02 0.12 5.92E-02 0.46 
Fraction that fall 
within a factor of 
100 (F100) 
 1.00  1.00  0.67  1.00  0.67 
F100 values for U-
2A source term of 
three closest 
monitoring sits 
 1.00  0.67  1.00  1.00  0.67 
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Figure 35.  U-2A Hazard Plot of I-131 Air Concentration 
 
Figure 36.  U-6 Hazard Plot of I-131 Air Concentration 
 




Figure 37.  U-7 Hazard Plot of I-131 Air Concentration 
 
Discussion of Results 
A common feature of all the source term data runs is the significant number of 
underestimations by the HPAC software.  Underestimations are typically unacceptable as 
they can provide a sense of relief, when in fact a danger exists.  However, the opposite 
also is a problem, since large overestimations of the hazard will cause unnecessary panic 
and concern. 
A general observation of all data runs is that the monitoring sites closest to 
Chornobyl (Stockholm, Budapest and Helsinki) had better predictions, with the majority 
of the HPAC predictions at these sites being within the accepted accuracy.  Table 25 
displays for each data run the percent of predictions that fall within a factor of 100 for all 
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sites, and the percent that falls within a factor of 100 for the three closest sites.  Another 
general observation is that for the three farthest monitoring sites (Paris, Mol and Monaco) 
HPAC usually failed to predict the arrival of I-131 until after 1 May; once the software 
did predict the arrival at the three farthest monitoring sites only 4 of the 13 data runs 
showed predictions falling within a factor of 100 at least 50% of the time. 




Specification 1 May 2 May 3 May 4 May 5 May 
Average 
F100 
   N-1A Plant conditions 0.40 0.36 0.50 0.42 0.33 0.40 
   N-1B Plant conditions 0.40 0.36 0.50 0.42 0.33 0.40 
   N-2 Severe accident 0.40 0.45 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.52 
   N-3 Moderate accident 0.00 0.09 0.25 0.25 0.42 0.20 
   N-4 See-N-3  0.00 0.09 0.25 0.25 0.33 0.18 
   U-1 Isotopic release rate 0.50 0.45 0.42 0.58 0.50 0.49 
   U-2A External Rad file 0.50 0.36 0.50 0.67 0.75 0.56 
   U-2B External Rad file 0.40 0.36 0.50 0.67 0.75 0.54 
   U-3 Mix specified by analyst 0.50 0.45 0.58 0.58 0.67 0.56 
   U-4A Percent inventory 0.40 0.27 0.42 0.50 0.42 0.40 
   U-4B Percent inventory 0.40 0.27 0.33 0.33 0.42 0.35 
   U-5 
See U-2A 
0.50 0.36 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.32 
   U-6 See U-3  0.20 0.18 0.33 0.33 0.42 0.30 
   U-7 See U-2A (reduced domain) 1.00 1.00 0.67 1.00 0.67 0.87 
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   Overall, the NFAC-generated source terms did not perform as well as the user-
defined source terms.  This was expected since the NFAC-generated source terms over-
calculated the activity released.  Reviewing the F100 values, the best performing NFAC-
generated source term, the N-2 data run (severe accident plant condition), performed 
comparably to the worst performing user-defined source term, the U-1 data run (isotopic 
release rate specification). 
Table 26.  Fraction of Predictions that Fall Within a Factor of 100 
Test ID For All 12 Monitoring Sites 
For the Three 
Closest 
Monitoring Sites 
   N-1A 0.40 0.60 
   N-1B 0.40 0.53 
   N-2 0.52 0.60 
   N-3 0.20 0.40 
   N-4 0.18 0.26 
   U-1 0.49 0.80 
   U-2A 0.56 0.87 
   U-2B 0.54 0.73 
   U-3 0.56 0.80 
   U-4A 0.40 0.60 
   U-4B 0.35 0.60 
   U-5 0.32 0.33 
   U-6 0.30 0.67 
   U-7 N/A 0.87 
     
Another figure of merit for comparing the performance of each of the 14 data runs 
is the bias.  It was computed using the following equation: 
)(1 i
i
iN OCBias −×= ∑                                                   (3) 
where 
 N = the total number of measurements for each data run (N=57 for all 12 
monitoring sites, N=15 for the three closest monitoring sites) 
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 C = the HPAC calculation value of the air concentration (Bq/m3) 
 O = the measured observation value of the air concentration (Bq/m3) 
 i = the iteration, from 1 to N, of the summation 
The bias provides an indication of the average under prediction or over prediction of each 
data run.  Unlike the factor from data value, which does not indicate the significance of a 
prediction of 0.00 Bq/m3, the bias value does consider it in the calculation.  Table 27 
provides the results of calculating the bias for each of the data runs.  A general  
Table 27.  Results of Bias Calculations  
Test ID 
For All 12 
Monitoring Sites 
(Bq/m3) 




   N-1A +214600 +652800 
   N-1B +250200 +734000 
   N-2 +2133 +5089 
   N-3 -1.1 +1474 
   N-4 -0.6 +0.4 
   U-1 +1893 +6284 
   U-2A +8.7 +24.6 
   U-2B +11.2 +35.4 
   U-3 +150500 +571800 
   U-4A +1226 +3240 
   U-4B +1357 +3745 
   U-5 +3705 +10440 
   U-6 +705 +2350 
   U-7 N/A +28.2 
 
 
observation of the results of the bias calculations is that most of the data runs results of 
positive values for the bias, meaning the data run tended to over predict air concentration 
values.  The magnitude of the bias provides an indication of the amount of over 
prediction or under prediction.  A bias value of 0.0 Bq/m3 would indicate that the data 
run, in total, neither under predicted or over predicted its results. 
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NFAC-generated Source Terms 
 The N-1 pair of source terms released three times the activity of I-131 specified in 
the Chornobyl literature that was used for the user-defined source terms.  As a result, the 
majority of the predictions from these runs overestimated the air concentration 
measurements.  (These over predictions are evident in the reviewing the values for the 
bias of the N-1A and N-1B data runs in Table 27.)  Additionally, most of the 
underestimated predictions were values of 0.00E+00 Bq/m3, meaning HPAC had yet to 
predict the arrival of the material at that location.  The N-1A and N-1B data runs were 
identical, except the latter used a larger reactor power level.  The result was a greater 
release and transport of I-131.  80% of the air concentration measurements from the N-
1B data run were larger than from N-1A.  
The N-2 and N-3 source terms also specified a release of I-131 greater than that 
specified in the literature, with the same result as in the N-1 series of runs.  However, 
although the N-2 and N-3 runs released less total activity than the N-1 series, they are 
released over a significantly shorter duration.  Whereas the N-1 series was released over 
an 11-day period, the N-2 source term was released in 30 hours, and the N-3 source term 
was released in 42 hours.  This resulted in overestimations on or about the same order of 
magnitude as the N-1 runs if not greater.  When reviewing the F100 values, the overall 
performance of the N-2 run was better than the N-1 and N-3 runs, indicating that a 
Chornobyl-type accident may best be modeled as a Severe accident when using NFAC-
generated source terms.  However, an examination of the bias values would indicate that 
the N3 data run is the best.  This conclusion would be misleading, though since nearly 
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50% of the run’s predictions are 0.00 Bq/m3.  Thus, the F100 and bias values must be 
reviewed together to gain an understanding of the performance of any data run. 
 The N-4 source term was identical to the N-3 source term except SCIPUFF was 
run in fast mode.  A review of the F100 values displayed in Table 22 shows that overall 
the performance of the software was no worse in the fast mode, except for the 5 May 
F100 value.  A review of the individual predictions, however, shows differences in the 
values of the non-zero predictions of an order of magnitude or more.  These variations 
should be expected given the relaxation of the SCIPUFF-parameters discussed in Chapter 
III. 
User-defined Source Terms 
 The U-1 source term took the total release from the ATMES source term and 
input it as a single release rate.  Although the U-1 source term was a linear release it 
performed nearly as well as the detailed ATMES source term runs (U-2 A & B).  The 
greatest difference from the U-2 pair occurred on 5 May.  This most likely is the result of 
the linear release of this source term, since the true release decreased daily after the first 
day, and only began to increase during the middle period of the release timeline.  The 
result is that on 5 May 92% of the U-1 values are greater than the values of the U-2A run 
(an identical run except for the source term). 
 An examination of the F100 values in Table 26 (page 72) shows that the U-2 pair 
of source terms performed the best.  This was anticipated since they used the most 
detailed source term information.  Reviewing the values that are within a factor of 100, 
both overestimated and underestimated values were generally less than a factor of 50 
also.  The results for the 600-meter release height from the U-2B run were often slightly 
 75  
 
greater than the 300-meter release height from the U-2A run.  A possible explanation has 
to do with the material being lofted higher in the atmosphere for transport.  A review of 
the upper-air weather data showed that wind speed generally increased with altitude, as 
expected.  The effect is that the I-131 moved down range more quickly, allowing for 
more activity to be deposited further away.  With a short half-life of 8.02 days, the longer 
I-131 remained aloft, the less activity would eventually be deposited.  For example, Paris 
is the monitoring site farthest from Chornobyl.  HPAC predicted the arrival of material 
after 4 May for both runs, with the air concentration on 0900, 5 May from the U-2B run 
(600 meter release height) being greater than U-2A run (300 meter release height). 
 The U-3 source term was generated using the data in the RBMK reactor inventory 
file, releasing 20% of the total, as specified in the Chornobyl literature (see Table 2 on 
page 19).  The resulting release of 13.0 MCi was similar to the ATMES release of 12.6 
MCi.  As with the U-1 run, the U-3 source term was a linear release and it performed 
nearly as well as the detailed U-2A run (an identical run except for the source term). 
 The performance of the U-4 series of source terms was nearly as good as the U-2 
series.  For example, the U-2A data run had an average F100 value of 0.56 and the U-4A 
data run had an average F100 value of 0.40.  When observing the three closest 
monitoring sites the U-2A average F100 value was 0.87 and the U-4A average F100 
value was 0.60.  The reduction in performance was expected, given that the U-4 series 
involved compressing eleven daily release values, from the ATMES source term, into 
values for five release periods.  A data run using the Percent Inventory specification with 
the first five daily release values of the ATMES source term was conducted, although not 
documented in this thesis.  The performance for both the 300m and 600m releases was 
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better than the U-4A and U-4B data runs, although still slightly less than the U-2A and 
U-2B data runs.  However, since these unreported data runs did not involve the release of 
the total source term this could affect have adversely affected the calculation of air 
concentrations later in the time period.  Thus their performance could be suspect when 
compared to data runs using the total source term, and therefore were not reported. 
 The U-5 source term took the best performing user-defined source term, U-2A, 
and used the built-in upper air climatology to determine the effect on the predicted results 
of not having actual observations available.  The results illustrate the importance of using 
the most current weather forecasts or actual observations.  Not using the available 
weather data resulted in the U-5 run not performing as well as the U-2A run.  As 
illustrated in Figure 34 (page 66) the HPAC climatology file resulted in the plume 
moving mainly to the north, with the highest concentrations being recorded at the 
Helsinki monitoring site.  For the U-2A data run for which the U-5 used for a baseline, 
the highest concentrations were recorded to the west of Chornobyl at the Bratislava and 
Budapest monitoring sites, which generally agrees with the measured observations in 
Table 10 (page 55). 
 The U-6 source term was to test the performance of HPAC with SCIPUFF 
running in the fast mode.  As with the standard versus fast mode runs using NFAC-
generated source terms (N-3 and N-4), there was a difference in predicted values from the 
two runs, typically in the range of an order of magnitude.  This is evident in reviewing 
the U-2A and U-6 hazard plots on page 69, where the same five contour values are not 
identically plotted.  Although they generally have the same shape, the further out 
contours (contours with smaller values) show a larger displacement.  In addition to the 
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reduced F100 values obtained when running in fast mode, there was a significant 
difference in the bias values also.  The corresponding standard mode run (U-2A) had a 
bias calculation of +8.715 Bq/m3, while the fast mode run increased over 8000% to +705 
Bq/m3.  Thus, although a previous thesis pointed out that no significant difference was 
encountered when running the fast mode vice standard mode [Frederick:64], analysts 
should perform runs in both modes to determine the effect on the predictions. 
 The U-7 source term was identical to the U-2A source term.  However, SCIPUFF 
calculations were done over a smaller domain to determine if a smaller domain improved 
the performance of HPAC.  Because SCIPUFF is limited to the number of grid points 
generated over the 3D domain, specifying a smaller domain would improve the 
resolution, thus possibly resulting in improved performance.  Comparing the results of 
the U-7 data run with the results of the corresponding monitoring sites of the U-2A data 
run shows that the reduced domain calculations resulted in F100 values as good as those 
of the full domain calculations, except for one day (2 May) when the F100 value is better.  
However, there was a downturn in performance for the bias of this reduced domain run.  
The bias value for the original U-2A data run (full domain of Europe) was +24.6 Bq/m3 
(the best bias value of any user-defined source term) for the three closest monitoring 
sites, whereas the bias value for the U-7 data run (reduced domain of U-2A run) was 
+28.2 Bq/m3.  Thus, although the reduced domain data run (U-7) resulted in the same 
number of predictions falling within a factor of 100, the actual value of the predictions 
were, on average, larger than their corresponding values in the U-2A data run. 
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Sensitivity Analysis of Input Parameters 
A sensitivity analysis was attempted to determine the effect of changes in select 
input parameters on the resulting predictions.  The impetus for such an analysis was to 
determine what changes, and how great the changes, in output would occur when a 
parameter is increased or decreased by 10% from a known baseline value.  The baseline 
for this analysis was the U-4A data run.  The two input parameters that were tested were 
the release height, and reactor power level, with a baseline of 300 m and 2775 MW(t), 
respectively.  The reactor power level parameter is used to calculate the core inventory of 
radionuclides for the NFAC-generated source terms and the user-defined source terms 
that specify a percentage of the core inventory to release.  Thus, increasing the reactor 
power would result in a greater source term.  The height of release affects the transport 
because of the differing wind speeds and directions at varying altitudes.  Figures 37, 38 
and 39 display the output for changes in the release height, and Figures 40, 41 and 42 
display the output for changes in the reactor power level. 
 The results of varying the release height (Figures 37, 38 and 39) show little 
variability in the general shape and location of the contours.  The results of varying the 
reactor power (Figures 40, 41 and 42) shows even less difference in the shape and 
location of the contours.  Thus, given the parameters of release height and reactor power 
level, variability in the release height value appears to have a greater impact on the 
output. 
 In addition to comparing contour plots for the sensitivity analysis, a comparison 
of results for one of the monitoring sites (Budapest) was performed.  Those results 
showed extreme variability despite the relative agreement among the contour plots.  For 
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example, 5 May air concentration values were 5.25E+03, 3.19E+02, 4.95E+03 for 330m, 
300m, and 270m, respectively. 
A final set of runs using the U-4A data run as a baseline was conducted to find 
out if a change in the source term would improve the performance.  The impetus for these 
runs was to determine if the ATMES source term (12.6 MCi total release) could be 
improved upon by varying the release by ±10%.  The results are summarized in Table 28.  
Whether the release was less than or greater than the ATMES source term resulted in 
reduced performance for each of the five days.  The conclusion drawn from these results 
is that the ATMES source term is an accurate estimate of what was released based on the 
observed data.  This is to be expected, given that the ATMES source term is the result of 
years of study by the IAEA, the Soviet Union, and others. 
Comparison with ATMES Results 
One of the purposes of the ATMES study was to “review and intercalibrate 
models of atmospheric transport of radionuclides over short and long distances” [Klug, et 
al:1].  Twenty-one models were evaluated in the study, including two from organizations 
in the United States: the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and Savannah 
River Laboratory (SRL).  Although the full results of the evaluation were not available 
for this research, a brief comparison of the performance of the two U.S. models, as 
discussed in the ATMES text, with HPAC is made. 
Both U.S models tended to underestimate the concentration values for I-131.  The 
LLNL model underestimated 82% of its measurements, and the SRL model 
underestimated 78% of its measurements [Klug, et al.:70,168].  Similarly, using the U-
2A data run, which used the ATMES source term, HPAC underestimated 73% of its 
 80  
 
 
Figure 38.  U-4A Hazard Plot for 330 m Release Height 
 
 
Figure 39.  U-4A Hazard Plot for 300 m Release Height 
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Figure 40.  U-4A Hazard Plot for 270 m Release Height 
 
 
Figure 41.  U-4A Hazard Plot for 3000 MW(t) Reactor Power 
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Figure 42.  U-4A Hazard Plot for 2775 MW(t) Reactor Power 
 
 
Figure 43.  U-4A Hazard Plot for 2500 MW(t) Reactor Power 
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Table 28.  Results of Estimating an Improved Source Term 
Source Term  1 May 2 May 3 May 4 May 5 May
11.3 MCi 0.40 0.27 0.33 0.42 0.42 
12.6 MCi 0.60 0.45 0.50 0.50 0.67 
13.9 MCi 0.40 0.27 0.42 0.42 0.42 
 
 
measurements.  Another comparison is with the percent of predicted values that are 
within a factor of 5 of the observations.  The LLNL model predicted 42% within a factor 
of 5, and the SRL model predicted 10% [Klug, et al.:70, 168].  HPAC predicted 12% of 
values within a factor of 5, which is between the predictions of the LLNL and SRL 
models.  
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V.  Research Summary and Conclusions 
 
This final chapter provides a summation of the research, and conclusions drawn 
from the research.  Additionally, recommendations for further research using the HPAC 
software and notes for modifying the software are included. 
Research Summary 
This research has focused on using the NFAC incident module of the HPAC 
software to model an accident at a commercial nuclear power plant.  Modeling the 
Chornobyl accident was important for at least two reasons.  First, reactors of this design 
are still in operation, and given that human error was the proximate cause of the accident, 
a recurrence of the Chornobyl accident could take place.  Secondly, the severity of the 
accident provides a significant data point for modeling the explosive release of large 
amounts of radioactive material.  Overall, the results of the user-defined source terms 
agree better than do the NFAC-generated source terms with the best estimates of the 
source term as documented in the IAEA, ATMES, and Soviet reports.   
Conclusions 
 Table 29 summarizes the average F100 values from each data run.  In addition, an 
F100 value is calculated for each data run using the factor from data values of the three 
monitoring sites closest to Chornobyl (Budapest, Helsinki and Stockholm).  Generally, 
the better the average F100 value of the data run, the better the average F100 value for 
the three closest monitoring sites.  Thus the HPAC predictions of the closest monitoring 
sites contributed significantly to the overall performance of the particular data run, 
indicating there may be a spatial domain limit for the best performance of the HPAC 
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Table 29.  Summary of Average F100 Values 
Test ID Average F100 of all Monitoring Sites 
Average F100 of 
Three Closest Sites 
N-1A 0.40 0.60 
N-1B 0.40 0.53 
N-2 0.52 0.60 
N-3 0.20 0.40 
N-4 0.18 0.26 
U-1 0.49 0.80 
U-2A 0.56 0.87 
U-2B 0.54 0.73 
U-3 0.56 0.80 
U-4A 0.40 0.60 
U-4B 0.35 0.60 
U-5 0.32 0.33 
U-6 0.30 0.67 
U-7 N/A 0.87 
 
software.  For example, Frederick’s study of the TMI-2 accident used a spatial domain 
with a radius on the order of 60 kilometers, and concluded that “the analyst should expect 
94% of the predicted values to be within a factor of 100” [Frederick:70].  One of the 
software developers had predicted that HPAC might be “challenged” by the temporal and 
spatial domains of this problem [Sjoreen, 2001b]. 
In addition to a spatial domain limitation, another factor to consider in the overall 
performance of HPAC is the particulate nature of the Chornobyl release.  This must be 
taken into account when the accident involves an explosion of the core.  The NFAC 
source term model does not allow the analyst to define a particle size distribution to allow 
for settling out of larger particles closer to the source; and transport of smaller particles 
further away, before deposition.  HPAC consistently underestimated predictions for the 
monitoring site farthest from Chornobyl for all data runs. 
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Given that regardless of which source term or source term specification was used 
the best results were obtained with the closer monitoring sites indicates that there is a 
limit to use of HPAC.  Even, when the spatial domain is reduced, the improvement in 
performance for the three closest monitoring sites was not significant.  HPAC is a 
“forward deployable, counterproliferation and counterforce tool for weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD)” [DTRA, 1999:2].  With this in mind, commanders are best served 
using the software on a tactical- or theater-level.  Scenarios on a strategic-level may 
suffer from poor performance as distance away from the incident/accident increases. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
 This research focused on one particular scenario for evaluating the NFAC 
module.  The NFAC module is also able to model accidents at reprocessing facilities and 
research reactors.  Those scenarios should be explored using known accidents.  The 
September 1957 explosion at a nuclear fuel reprocessing (plutonium separation) plant in 
Kyshtym, USSR, and the October 1957 Windscale accident in England are examples. 
 Two of the other source term models in the HPAC software are also of concern to 
nuclear engineers.  The nuclear weapon explosion (NWPN) and Radiological Weapon 
Incident (RWPN) modules warrant consideration for thesis research. 
Finally, the source term data used for this research can be considered at best only 
an estimate.  This is due to the severity of the Chornobyl accident and the lack of any 
ability to precisely monitor the release.  Thus, it has been difficult to attribute errors in 
the research; were errors attributable to the source term estimate, the weather data, or the 
transport and diffusion model?  To eliminate source term as a possible source of error, a 
study could look at tracer experiments that have been done in North America and Europe.  
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The European Tracer Experiment (ETEX), conducted in October and November 1994 is 
well documented.  This would serve as a validation study of the SCIPUFF transport and 
dispersion model. 
Notes on Modifying the HPAC Software 
 The research was conducted using HPAC version 3.2.1.  During the research 
HPAC version 4.0 was released.  However, it was not used for the research, based on the 
recommendation of Ms. Andrea Sjoreen of ORNL, because of computational errors by 
the NFAC incident model that resulted from migrating the software to a client/server 
architecture and rewriting the user interface in JAVA.  Later during the research, ORNL 
made available a beta version of 4.0.1.  However, even though it fixed the NFAC errors 
in HPAC version 4.0, many of the source term specifications in HPAC version 3.2.1 were 
not available in the 4.0.1 beta version.  Thus, its use in this research would not have been 
as beneficial as using HPAC version 3.2.1.  According to Ms. Sjoreen, when released, 
HPAC version 4.0.1 will have the same functionality as HPAC version 3.2.1. After 
working for a short time with the 4.0.1 beta version, the following comments are 
provided for improving future releases of the software. 
 1.  In HPAC version 3.2.1 the spatial domain selected by the user was the default 
domain plotted following the SCIPUFF run.  With HPAC version 4.0.1 beta there is no 
default plotted domain, even though the user specifies the spatial domain as part of the 
incident.  There is currently no option to type the spatial domain coordinates into a dialog 
box to get a specific plot domain.  Instead, the user takes the cursor and outlines a box 
around the incident in order to zoom into the domain.  It is not easy to outline the same 
size box around different data runs.  This makes comparing plots difficult, since the map 
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image may not always be the same for different runs, even when the same spatial domain 
is specified. 
 2.  Both HPAC version 3.2.1 and the newer releases have the capability to build 
an output table (.tab file) that stores a given dose or dose rate at a specific geographic 
location.  HPAC version 3.2.1 also has the capability to display the value at a specific 
location on the screen, eliminating the need to save the .tab file and then open it in a text 
editor to review.  That useful feature is not available in HPAC version 4.0.1 beta. 
 3.  The HPAC version 3.2.1 software contained three separate versions:  
Operational, Extended and Ultimate.  The analyst needed to determine which version was 
appropriate for the particular scenario and select it from the START-HPAC menu in 
Windows.  If the analyst wanted to use a different version, they would have to exit the 
current version and select another version.  In HPAC versions 4.0 and 4.0.1 beta, there is 
only one file to select, and within the HPAC software the analyst selects the version to 
run.  This allows for re-running of scenarios using the different versions without exiting 
the software.  However, selecting the version to run from the Edit menu is confusing.  
The default is to run the scenario in the operational version.  If the user selects to run the 
scenario in one of the other two versions it is a simple task to switch the version.  
However, if in reviewing the scenario before beginning the run the analyst chooses to 
review the version, the default version is highlighted in the dialog box, regardless of what 
version was selected previously. 
 4.  An important input parameter for defining the release of material is the height 
of release.  Both HPAC versions 3.2.1 and 4.0.1 beta allow for only a single release 
height to be specified for an incident.  As the Chornobyl accident demonstrated, this is an 
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unlikely scenario for an explosive release.  An option to specify the release height for 
each material release period would allow the software to more realistically simulate an 
incident. 
 




AFCCC – Air Force Combat Climatology Center 
ATMES – Atmospheric Transport Model Evaluation Study 
BWR – Boiling Water Reactor 
Bq – Becquerel, unit of radioactive decay equivalent to 1 disintegration per second 
Ci – Curie, unit of radioactive decay equivalent to 3.7E+10 disintegrations per second 
CEC – Commission of the European Communities 
DNA – Defense Nuclear Agency 
DTRA – Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
HASCAL – Hazard Assessment System for Consequence Analysis software 
HPAC – Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability software 
JRC – Joint Research Center, located at Ispra, Italy 
LLNL – Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
NFAC – Nuclear Facility incident model, also known as a source term model 
NPP – Nuclear Power Plant 
NRC – Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
ORNL – Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
RASCAL – Radiological Assessment System for Consequence Analysis software 
RBMK – Reactor Bolshoi Moschnosti Kanalynyi, Russian for Channelized Large Power 
Reactor 
 
SCIPUFF – Second-order Closure Integrated PUFF atmospheric transport and diffusion 
model 
 
SRL – Savannah River Laboratory 
 
TADMOD – Transport And Dispersion MODel 
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Appendix A.  Preparation of Custom Rad File Using ATMES Source Term 
 
This appendix provides information on the Rad file that was prepared in order to 
run the HPAC software with a user-defined, custom source term.  Most users of the 
HPAC software will typically specify conditions for the incident using NFAC, which 
computes the source term and prepares the resulting Rad file.  Source terms can also be 
created outside NFAC and imported using the External Rad File option.  For this 
research, a Rad file was prepared to mirror the specific releases of I-131 from the 
ATMES source term. 
The Rad file defines the materials, computed doses, and plotted doses in an 
NFAC incident.  When creating a custom Rad file, the burden is on the user to ensure the 
file is properly formatted and the data values represented are reasonable.  SCIPUFF will 
not be able to process an incorrectly formatted Rad file.  The Rad file is divided into 5 
sections:  material data, computed dose factors, plotted dose data, dose factors and non-
SCIPUFF data.  Each section is described below. 
Material Data 
Materials are substances transported by SCIPUFF.  SCIPUFF recognizes two 
types of NFAC materials – depositing gas and non-depositing gas.  Thus all materials 
released from a reactor are treated as a gas, with particles being treated as depositing 
gases 1 micron in diameter.  This design decision is based on the indeterminate nature of 
the release from a reactor accident [Sjoreen, 2001b].  The first item in the material file is 
the Material Units, either Ci (Curies) or Bq (Becquerels).  This is followed by the 
exposure duration, the total time from the start of the incident that SCIPUFF will 
transport and decay the material.  Then the materials are described with their name, 
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number of particle size groups, mean particle size, and the release start time and release 
duration.  The particles sizes defined in the Rad file are only used to help document the 
file.  Each material file contains the particle size that is used in SCIPUFF (SCIPUFF 
assumes a mean particle size of 1 micron for all materials).  Here is an example of the 





EXPOSURE_DURATION= 11.00E+00 D 
NUMBER_MATERIALS_AIR= 5 
MATERIAL= BqDP1 1  
1.0 
RELEASE_START= 0.00000E-01 D 
RELEASE_DURATION= 2.00000E+00 D 
MATERIAL= BqDP2 1  
1.0 
RELEASE_START= 2.00000E+00 D 
RELEASE_DURATION= 2.00000E+00 D 
MATERIAL= BqDP3 1  
1.0 
RELEASE_START= 4.00000E+00 D 
RELEASE_DURATION= 2.00000E+00 D 
MATERIAL= BqDP4 1  
1.0 
RELEASE_START= 6.00000E+00 D 
RELEASE_DURATION= 2.00000E+00 D 
MATERIAL= BqDP5 1  
1.0 
RELEASE_START= 8.00000E+00 D 
RELEASE_DURATION= 3.00000E+00 D 
 
NUMBER_MATERIALS_GROUND= 0 
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Computed Dose Factors 
Computed dose factors are the scaling factors that SCIPUFF uses to compute 
doses.  In this section the user indicates how SCIPUFF will use the dose factors to 
compute doses.  Each line includes the dose factor name, its dose units, and one of three 
identifiers for the type of activity to which the dose applies (AIR, GROUND, or SHINE).  
For this research, SCIPUFF calculated air concentration measurements of I-131.  Here is 
an example of the computed dose factors section of a Rad file: 
 
NUMBER_DOSE_FACTORS= 1 
DOSE_FACTOR= AIR_CONCENTRATION Bq/M**3 AIR 
Plotted Dose Data 
Plotted doses are those quantities that are presented as the output from SCIPUFF.  
They consist of one or more computed doses in a linear combination defined in the above 
computed dose factors section.  Each plotted dose is entered as its name, units and the 
number of component doses.  A plotted dose often has the same name as a computed 
dose factor.  It is the names of the plotted dose data that appear as the options available 
for plotting in the HPAC Plot Control window.  Here is an example of the plotted dose 
data section of a Rad file: 
 
NUMBER_PLOTTED_DOSES= 1 









The dose factors are enclosed in the keywords “Begin_Dose_Factors” and 
“End_Dose_Factors”.  The data for each exposure time begin with the keyword 
“Exposure_Time” followed by those dose factors at that exposure time.  Dose factors are 
entered in the order in which they are listed in the plotted dose data section above, with 
data for each plotted dose name beginning on a new line.  The dose factors represent the 
activity of the material in the material unit defined at the start of the Rad file; in this case 
Becquerels.  For each of the file materials, the dose factors indicate the activity of the 
material for the exposure time.  Since SCIPUFF does not know what specific 
radioisotope it is transporting, only the total activity, the user must decay the material for 
each release time.  In this case, I-131 with a half-life of 8.02 days, will show significant 
decay for each successive material release.  For calculations at times other than those 
specified in the Rad file, SCIPUFF, by design, performs a linear (not exponential) decay 




EXPOSURE_TIME= 0.00000E+00 D 
  2.46E+17   0.00E-1      0.00E-1      0.00E-1      0.00E-1   
EXPOSURE_TIME= 2.00000E+00 D 
  2.07E+17   6.92E+16   0.00E-1      0.00E-1      0.00E-1   
EXPOSURE_TIME= 4.00000E+00 D 
  1.74E+17   5.82E+16   2.08E+16   0.00E-1      0.00E-1   
EXPOSURE_TIME= 6.00000E+00 D 
  1.46E+17   4.90E+16   1.75E+16   5.82E+16   0.00E-1   
EXPOSURE_TIME= 8.00000E+00 D 
  1.23E+17   4.12E+16   1.47E+16   4.90E+16   7.19E+16   
 






Since other programs besides SCIPUFF may use the RAD file, there are 
keywords defined to delimit data to be read by SCIPUFF and not read by SCIPUFF.  All 
SCIPUFF data must appear between the keywords “Begin_SCIPUFF_Data” and 
“End_SCIPUFF_Data.”  Any non-SCIPUFF data should be placed at the end of the Rad 
file, and must be placed between the keywords “Begin_Special_Application_RAD_File_ 
Data” and “End_Special_Application_RAD_File_Data”.  No non-SCIPUFF data 
appeared in the custom Rad files for this research, thus those keywords were excluded. 
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Appendix B.  Weather Data 
 
Since this research studied a past event it was possible to obtain the actual 
observed weather data.  This contrasts with using numerical weather prediction (NWP) 
data, fixed winds, or HPAC’s historical weather when performing a study of a scenario 
that has yet to occur.  This appendix highlights the weather data used in this research.   
The Air Force Combat Climatology Center (AFCCC) in Asheville, North 
Carolina provided the weather data upon submission of a Support Assistance Request 
(SAR) form found on the AFCCC public access website.  Turn-around time for the 
request was one week.  Coordination was made with AFCCC to provide the data in a 
format as close as possible to that used in HPAC [Foster, S.].  The data was received as 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheets, and, following additional formatting of the data and error 
checking, was saved as tab-delimited ASCII text files.  The text files contained more than 
24 Megabytes (Mb) of data covering the continent of Europe during the 11-day period of 
the accident and subsequent release. 
HPAC recognizes several different formats for weather files.  The format used in 
this research was Observation.  The Observation file format has two subformats:  Profile 
and Surface.  Profile data consists of upper-air profile observations, and has a .prf 
extension. Surface data consists of surface (ground level) observations and has an .sfc 
extension.  It was not uncommon for the upper-air profile observations to also contain 
observations made at or near ground level.  
A typical upper-air profile input data file is shown in Figure 44.  The first line for 
each profile contains the header data; information specific to the station providing the 
data.  The first column in the header data contains the text “ID:” which HPAC uses to 
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recognize a new station and data.  The second column contains the station ID, typically a 
numeric code assigned by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO).  The third 
column contains the date the data was collected, and the fourth column contains the time.  
The fifth and sixth columns contain the location of the station expressed in decimal 
degrees of latitude and longitude, respectively.  The last column in the header data 
contains the elevation above mean sea level (MSL) of the station.  The rows that follow 
the header line contain the following information in six columns:  the elevation at which 
the data was collected in units of meters, the wind speed in meters per second, the wind 
direction in degrees, the atmospheric pressure in millibars, the temperature in degrees 
Celsius, and the humidity as a percent.  A typical range over which soundings were made 
was from 0 to 30,000 meters above ground level (AGL).  Data were collected four times 
each day at 06:00, 12:00, 18:00 and 24:00 GMT.  Entries of “-9999” denote missing or 
unmeasured data points.  This is the value recognized by HPAC.  However  the standard 
 
Figure 44.  Sample of Upper Air Profile Weather Data 
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meteorological practice is to identify missing data as “9999”.  The Upper Air Profile data 
file used in this research was 4.23 Mb in size, and spanned the time period 18:00 GMT 
25 April 1986 to 12:00 GMT 7 May 1986. 
A typical surface observation input data file is shown in Figure 45.  Each line of 
data contains the following information:  station ID, date of the observation, time the data 
was collected, latitude of the station in decimal degrees, longitude of the station in 
decimal degrees, elevation of the station above MSL in units of meters, elevation above 
the ground at which the sounding was taken in meters, wind direction in degrees, wind 
speed in meters per second, atmospheric pressure in millibars, temperature in degrees 
Celsius and humidity in percent.  Since weather measurements are typically never taken 
exactly at ground level (i.e. zero meters AGL), HPAC does not recognize non-positive 
numbers in the elevation column.  An additional column was added to the data provided 
by AFCCC, with a value of “2” placed in for all the data points, to specify the elevation 
at which the sounding was taken.  Values of “-9999” denote missing or unmeasured data 
points.  Unlike the times at which upper-air data was collected, surface observations were 
taken at varying times throughout the day.  The surface observation data file used in this 
research was 20.2 Mb in size and spanned the time period 21:00 GMT, 25 April 1986 to 
03:00 GMT, 7 May 1986. 
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Figure 45.  Sample of Surface Observation Weather Data 
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Appendix C.  HPAC Contour Plots 
 
This Appendix contains HPAC contour plots.  Each contour plot of I-131 air 
concentration is from 5 May 1986 (0900Z) near the end of the time period that the HPAC 



















Figure 48.  N-2 Hazard Plot of I-131 Air Concentration 








Figure 50.  N-4 Hazard Plot of I-131 Air Concentration 








Figure 52.  U-2A Hazard Plot of I-131 Air Concentration 








Figure 54.  U-3 Hazard Plot of I-131 Air Concentration 




Figure 55.  U-4A Hazard Plot of I-131 Air Concentration 
 
 
Figure 56.  U-4B Hazard Plot of I-131 Air Concentration 




Figure 57.  U-5 Hazard Plot of I-131 Air Concentration 
 
 
Figure 58.  U-6 Hazard Plot of I-131 Air Concentration 
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